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FINANCING PUBLICLY OWNED
TREATMENT WORKS AND INSTITUTING
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES AGAINST
NON-COMPLIANT WORKS UNDER
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
BY VALENTINA 0. OKARU*
SECTION ONE
INTRODUCTION:
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Evidence of Poor Performance; Reasons For and Nature of
Municipal Non-compliance' With the Clean Water Act (CWA):
2
* Dr. Valentina 0. Okaru is currently a consultant with the World Bank.
She was awarded a J.S.D. degree at Stanford Law School in June 1994. She
received an LL.M from the University of London, L.S.E. in 1987 and earned an
MA in international affairs from Tufts University, Fletcher School in 1989.
Valentina Okaru appreciated the valuable direction of her professors at the
Stanford Law School, particularly Professor John Barton, Professor Baton
Thompson and Professor Peter Menel. All the viewpoints and opinions
expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1. A facility may not comply with its permit in several ways. For instance, it
may have discharges with pollutant concentrations exceeding the permit's
effluent limitations, it may fail to meet planning or construction requirements in
a permit or agreement. The facility may fail to submit relevant reports and may
not prepare or enforce a required pretreatment program. The nature of the
violation is not relevant for purposes of my study.
2. The Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)). Regulation of Publicly Owned
Treatment Works (POTWs) is one of the objectives of the CWA.
Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Concerning the
Performance of Municipal Waste Water Treatment Construction Grants
Program): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
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Reports3 illustrate that of the rivers and streams in the
United States that do not meet their state water quality standards,
17 percent are failing because of pollution from publicly owned
treatment works (POTWs or publicly owned waste water treatment
facilities) while 22 percent of estuaries are polluted primarily
because of POTWs.
Municipal waste waters generally consist of domestic wastes
and toxic substances used in some homes and in manufacturing and
commercial establishments. The toxic substances include motor
oil, paint, household cleaners, and pesticides. Toxic pollutants pose
a serious threat to people and animals.4 The nation's sewers
collect the flow of used water from homes, commercial
establishments and industry. The wastes are transported to a
sewage treatment plant. The Environmental Protection Agency
estimates that about 37 percent of toxic industrial compounds
entering the nation's waters and estuaries pass from industry
through POTWs.5 Some of the 34 million gallons of waste water
House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 1709 (1981)
(Hearings on Construction Grants Program, 1981).
3. See, e.g., Lee Thomas, EPA Administrator, Office of Water, Press Briefing:
Municipal Compliance With the Clean Water Act (July 27, 1988).
4. General Accounting Office (GAO), Rep. to the Chairman, Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Water Pollution, Nonindustrial
Waste Water Pollution Can Be Better Managed (Dec. 1991) (GAO, 1991
Nonindustrial Waste Report).
5. EPA, Environmental Regulations and Technology: the National Pretreatment
Program 4 (July 1986). To address the problem posed by industrial discharges
to public sewer systems, the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments established the National Pretreatment Program. The program
required all industries discharging waste water into POTWs to clean up or
pretreat their waste water. I shall not deal with the problem of discharging
industrial wastes into POTWs but shall deal with matters concerning discharging
wastes from POTWs into the nation's waterways.
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collected by the nation's sewers each day from households,6
commercial enterprises and industries contain toxic substances. A
Palo Alto, California treatment plant determined that up to 81
percent of the silver entering the facility comes from non-industrial
sources.7 Additionally, a study estimated that up to 26 percent of
the Zinc and 22 percent of the copper and cyanide that entered a
Palo Alto plant came from households.8
In 1989, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) conceded that over two-thirds of the nation's 15,600 waste
water treatment plants failed to comply9 with CWA standards.'
According to a survey conducted in 1988 by the General
Accounting Office (GAO), non-compliance is more rampant in
small communities.
Surveys conducted as early as 1980 illustrate that municipal
facilities constituted approximately 26 percent of all effluent
6. GAO, 1991 Nonindustrial Waste Report, supra note 4. Households account
for about 15 percent of regulated toxic wastes entering treatment plants. EPA
estimates that as industrial pollutants entering POTWs decrease, the toxic
pollutants entering treatment plants from both household and commercial
pollutants will increase and will account for about two-thirds of all toxic
chemicals discharged to treatment plants.
7. Id. Nonindustrial pollution threatened aquatic animals in the South San
Francisco Bay. Hence, the plant imposed limits on silver discharges from
commercial photo processors, hospitals and dental offices.
8. Id.
9. The word "compliance" as used by the EPA signifies the installation of
treatment equipment capable of meeting the "best practicable technology" (BPT)
effluent limitations when properly operated.
10. Douglas Jehl, Clean Water Cost Put at $83.5 billion, L.A. Times, Feb. 1989,
at A 4.
11. GAO, Rep. to the Chairman, Comm. on Public Works and Transp., House
of Reps., Water Pollution, State Revolving Funds Insufficient to Meet Waste
Water Treatment Needs 37 (Jan. 1992) (GAO, 1992 Revolving Funds Report).
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dischargers. 12 During the same period, 87 percent of all POTWs
frequently violated their discharge limitations 3 and thirty-one
percent of the violators exceeded discharge limitations over fifty
percent of the time.14
In reaction to the municipalities' inability to construct the
sewage facilities required to comply with the 1977 deadline and the
federal government's failure to make funds available in time to
achieve the limitations by July 1977, Congress enacted the Clean
Water Act of 1977 (the 1977 Act).' 5 The 1977 Act amended
section 301(i) of the CWA 16 by providing the opportunity for
municipalities to apply to the Administrator for an extension of the
1977 compliance deadline to July 1983.17 Additionally, Congress
abolished the 1983 standards and provided for waivers of secondary
treatment standards in some settings where municipal sewage is
dumped into coastal waters. 8
12. Council on Environmental Quality, 1980 Annual Rep. 130 (1980).
13. GAO, Rep. by the Comptroller General of the United States, Costly Waste
Water Treatment Plants Fail to Perform as Expected 9 (Nov. 1980).
14. Id.
15. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1988).
17. West Virginia Dept. of Natural Resources, National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System, Municipal Waste Section, Permit Files (1987). The 1977
Act makes a distinction between so-called conventional pollutants (organic
matter, suspended solids, bacteria, Ph), which was the main focus of the 1972
Act and toxic pollutants. It is my view that by extending the 1977 compliance
deadline, Congress indirectly recognized that a shortage of federal funds had
hindered local compliance with the conditions specified in the CWA and that
efforts should be made to provide federal grants to municipalities for the
construction of sewage treatment plants.
18. Coastal Variance provisions, § 301(h) of the 1977 amendments to the 1972
Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (1988). For instance, primary treatment is adequate
for limited wastes that are produced by Alaska's small coastal communities such
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Despite legislative attempts to shift the deadline for POTW
compliance, the general performance of municipal sources was and
still is poorer than that of industrial sources. For instance, as early
as 1980, over 50 percent of all municipal dischargers were out of
compliance with the 1977 secondary treatment level requirements,
while as many as 80 percent of industrial dischargers succeeded in
meeting the same deadline for compliance.' 9 By 1981, sewage
from POTWs was still the main source of pollution contaminating
the nation's waterways.2' For example, in 1981, over 10,000
municipal dischargers, particularly those in small rural areas, were
still unable to meet the earlier deadline (July 1977) for achieving
secondary treatment level.
Consequently, Congress again altered section 301(h) of the
1972 CWA by enacting the Municipal Wastewater Treatment
Construction Grant Amendments of 198 1,21 which permitted
municipal dischargers to apply to the Administrator to extend the
deadline to July 1, 1988. Nevertheless, there was not a great
improvement in the level of compliance. In 1986, 37 percent of
municipal facilities were still not in compliance. 22 As of 1986,
municipal dischargers accounted for almost twice the amount of
as Ouzinkie. Effluent is disposed of through small diameter ocean outfalls.
James A Crum, Waste Water Treatment Trends in Alaska's Coastal
Communities, 61 Journal WPCF 1186 (July 1989).
19. H.R. No. 97-30, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1980) (Rep. On Construction
Grants Program, 1980). Council on Environmental Quality, 1979 Annual Rep.
113-14 (1979). Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, 1981, supra note
2, at 1713.
20. Hearings on the Construction Grants Program, 1981, supra note 2.
21. Pub. L. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623 (1981).
22. EPA, Environmental Progress and Challenges: EPA's Update 46, Fig W-1
(1988).
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stream pollution caused by industry sources.23 In 1992, 90
percent of industrial waste water treatment facilities in New York
state were still in compliance with state permit requirements as
compared with 81 percent of POTWs in the state.2 4
Focus, PURPOSE AND PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
Given the higher level of municipal non-compliance in
relation to industries, my paper will focus on enforcement against
publicly owned treatment works, especially as most studies have
concentrated on measures against private facilities25. However,
where relevant, I will discuss enforcement measures against
industries, including why there is such a disparity between firms
and districts in the level of compliance. Additionally, I will focus
primarily on those small 26 to medium sized communities where
there are more cases of the water pollution resulting from POTW
non-compliance.
My ultimate aim is to effectively deal with the problem of
POTW non-compliance at its roots by exploring the major
23. Id. POTWs cause 17 percent of stream pollution while industries cause 9
percent of pollution. Even as early as 1977, only 40 percent of municipal
sources caused water pollution compared to 80 percent of industrial dischargers.
24. Water Environment Federation, 4 Water Environment Technology 48 (Oct.
1992).
25. See, e.g., EPA, EPA Enforcement: A Progress Report, Air Noise,
Pesticides, Water, Dec. 1974, 1975 (1976); Russell W. Harrington and Vaughan,
Enforcing Pollution Control Laws (1986); Andreen, Beyond Words of
Exhortation: the Congressional Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement
of the Clean Water Act, 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 202 (1987).
26. Between 1972 and 1980, small communities (consisting of less than 10,000
people) in the United States constituted 38 percent of the national population
while large communities (comprising more than 100,000 people) represented 31
percent of the national population during the same period. GAO, 1992
Revolving Funds report, supra note 11, at 37.
CLEAN WATER ACT
underlying causes of poor municipal performance, particularly
pitfalls in the mode of financing and deficiencies in the
enforcement mechanism.
Therefore, in section two, I will examine the deficiencies in
the mode of financing and investing in waste water treatment
facilities. This will include an examination of the former27 Title
II Federal Grants Program and the current Title IV State Revolving
Fund Project. Additionally, I will explore the possibility of
adopting alternative means of financing and investing in such
plants.
In section three, I will examine the shortcomings in the
remedies28 imposed against POTWs for violating the relevant
provisions of the CWA. In evaluating the reliefs, I will explore a
number of factors, including economy (cost effectiveness), fairness
and effectiveness29 of measures taken by public and by private
enforcers against non-compliant publicly owned treatment
works.30  Additionally, I will address the role played by the
various arms of government,31 particularly the judiciary and the
1
27. For a better understanding and an illumination of the problem, I will conduct
a historical analysis of the mode of financing and investing in POTWs.
28. To limit the scope of the paper, my discussion will focus primarily on
remedies including civil penalties, environmental project funds (credit projects),
criminal sanctions, injunctive relief, sewer moratoria, receivership.
29. That is, whether or not the remedy will eliminate the causes of violations.
30. Most studies have not addressed the effectiveness of various remedies and
the impact of such measures on POTW compliance.
31. The various arms of government include the judiciary (courts), the
legislature (Congress) and the executive (public agencies). All power and duties
of government stem from the main structure of the Constitution of the United
States. The Constitution of the United States sets up a government of separated,
divided and limited powers. See generally, Lawrence Tribe, American
Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988). Power is divided not only horizontally among
the branches of the federal government but also vertically between the United
States and sovereign states. To limit the scope of my paper, I will not focus on
the relationship between federal and state enforcement agencies.
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legislative branch, in shaping the enforcement model.32
In section, four, I will conclude by summarizing the main
points and making some additional recommendations.
SECTION TWO
PITFALLS IN THE MODE OF FINANCING AND INVESTING IN
PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT WORKS AND
SHORTCOMINGS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
TITLE II AND TITLE IV
Investments; Financial Inability to Comply:
Between 1972 and 1984, the investments of the federal,
state and local governments totalled more than $55 billion.33
From 1972 through 1982, the availability of funds, particularly
federal grants, resulted in the completion of 9,000 sewage treatment
systems and supported the installation of an additional 8,000
facilities.34 Between 1972 and 1988, the EPA provided over $45
billion in federal grants to enable local communities to install and
upgrade sewage treatment facilities, while state and local
governments contributed $6 billion during the same period."
32. My focus on the enforcement model should not be misinterpreted to imply
that the model is always the best means of dealing with those that fail to comply
with the provisions of the CWA. There are other means of dealing with
violators, such as negotiations. However, to restrict the extent of my paper, I
will not discuss such alternative means of dispute resolution.
33. EPA, 1984 Needs Survey Report of Congress; Assessment of Needed
Publicly Owned Waste Water Treatment Facilities in the United States, 26 (Feb.
1985). Most of the investments were in California and East of the Mississippi
River while the per capita investment was in Alaska.
34. Council on Environmental Quality, Envtl. Quality 83-84 (1982).
35. Id.
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Approximately half of the cities served by non-compliant
sewage plants were and still are financially depressed. 6 Unmet
resource needs, particularly in small communities, are a threat to
local water quality and health.3 7 Without sufficient federal funds
and without alternative means of financing, municipalities,
particularly small districts, are unable to hire the necessary and
qualified technical and administrative staff to design and to install
good quality and cost efficient waste water treatment facilities.
3
Being unfamiliar with technical aspects of POTWs, some areas
including the Malden Public Service District often seek advice
from fly by night engineering consulting fims who improperly
install and design poor quality treatment plants.39 Consequently,
the badly designed and complex waste water treatment facilities
including those that are inefficiently operated and maintained
pollute waterways.
Despite the operation and maintenance problems, the federal
government was unable to invest sufficient funds on enhancing
36. Sewage Treatment: Rockefeller to Propose Deadline Extension for Municipal
Sewage Treatment Requirements, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 177 (June 3, 1988).
These cities have per capita incomes that are less than seventy-five percent of the
national average.
37. GAO, 1992 Revolving Funds Report, supra note 11, at 35.
38. Construction of Sewage Treatment Technology is a very expensive
proposition, particularly in communities located in the mountainous regions of
West Virginia.
39. Interview With Manager, Malden Public Service District, Sewage Treatment
Plant, West Virginia, October 1992. To discourage incompetent participation by
engineering consulting firms, the CWA provides that these firms would be held
responsible for any deficient POTW installed by them (engineers). Where the
POTW does not function within one year after construction, the engineering firm
responsible for installation shall be held responsible and liable. 33 U.S.C. §
1284 (d)(3) (1988).
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operation and maintenance training programs.40  For example,
although the 1972 Act initially authorized $7.5 million dollars
annually for POTW operator training programs,4' Congress
continually reduced the funds. Thus, by 1982, annual
authorizations were slashed down to only three million while no
specified sums were authorized for fiscal year 1983 through
1985.42 Moreover, the problem of inadequate federal funding for
training programs was further aggravated by the failure to
appropriate all the amount that Congress had authorized for such
programs. Annual appropriations was less than half the amount
annually authorized by Congress.43
Financial inability to comply with the CWA stems primarily
from deficiencies in the mode of financing and investing in such
facilities. The inadequacies in the system of financing and
investing in sewage plants include shortcomings in the
implementation of Title II of the CWA 4 (Federal Construction
40. With a number of factors, including operation and maintenance problems,
growth in the number of treatment facilities, increase in the amount of sewers in
service and in the percentage of households to be served, there should have been
an increase in operation and maintenance expenditures.
41. Sections 104(g)(1) and 104(u)(2) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1254 and
1254(u)(2).
42. Congress authorized such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 1983
through 1985.
43. H.R. Rep. No. 97-30, 97th Cong. 1st Sess., 1-2 13 (1981) (Rep. on
Construction Grants Program, 1981). Rep. on Construction Grants Program,
1980, supra note 19, at 3 and 8. On the other hand, local government operating
expenditures increased from $2.5 billion (48 percent of total local spending for
waste water treatment) in 1973 to $5.6 billion annually (85 percent of total local
waste water treatment expenditure). Congress of the United States,
Congressional Budget Office, Efficient Investments in Waste Water Treatment
Plants 4 (June 1985).
44. Pursuant to the 1972 Act, the federal government assumed 75 percent of the
cost of constructing waste water treatment facilities while the state and local
governments were to share the remaining 25 percent of capital costs. The pitfalls
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Grants Program) and of Title IV of the CWA (State Revolving
Fund (SRF)).45
In recognizing that construction of sewage treatment plants
was an expensive proposition,46 Congress established the Federal
Construction Grants Program as Title II of the CWA in 1972.47
The program authorized municipalities to obtain grants from the
federal government.4' Hence, the federal government assumed 75
in the implementation of Title II include an unfair system of distributing federal
grants; delays in administrative procedures, particularly in planning projects and
processing applications resulting in failure to meet the secondary treatment
deadline; some local resistance to the Title II construction grants program; the
impoundment of authorized federal grants; the high federal share of construction
costs and the inadequate local share resulting in a lack of local incentive.
45. Being administered by states, the State Revolving Funds (SRFs) are funds
that loan money provided by the federal capitalization grants and state matching
funds for waste water treatment programs or other projects. Most SRF loans
carry an interest rate of between 2 and 5 1/2 percent. By September 1990, 50
states and Puerto Rico had established State Revolving Funds and received at
least one capitalization grant from the Environmental Protection Agency. Unites
States EPA Report to Congress, Vol 6, No. 2 Small Flows (April 1992). The
state is authorized to loan money to municipalities at low interest rates. The
funds are paid back into the state capitalization funds. The pitfalls in the SRF
include a biased system of allocating loans in favor of large communities;
disincentives to private sector competition with public financing; the impediment
to public private partnership; and the restriction on the use of the SRF to
purchase land.
46. The Title II construction grant program is the second largest and most
expensive public works project ever to be implemented. The only other public
works program ever to receive larger grants is the National Highway program.
Section 101(a)(4) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988).
47. One of the long term goals of the program is to reduce the dumping of
municipal wastes into waterways and to protect public health.
48. Section 101(a)(4) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(4) (1988). See
generally Lee Thomas, EPA Administrator, Office of Water, Municipal
Compliance With the Clean Water Act (July 1988).
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percent of construction costs while the state and local governments
were responsible for the remaining 25 percent of capital expenses.
Congress authorized funds worth $18 billion for the fiscal
year 1973 through 1975. To implement the authorization, the
legislature appropriated $5 billion for fiscal year 1973, $6 billion
for fiscal year 1974 and as much as $7 billion for fiscal year
1975.49
Local Resistance to Title II; The Free Rider Problem:
After the enactment of the 1972 Act, there was initially
some local resistance to the implementation of Title II construction
grants. In particular, small semi-rural communities that had septic
tank systems5° were reluctant to contribute funds for the
installation of treatment plants. Claiming that they were financially
incapacitated, some districts hesitated to pay their share (25
percent) of installation costs which amounted to about $27
million."'
Some households were reluctant to pay user fees to their
districts. All the waste waters from various households in a district
flow into a connected sewer network of the municipality. The
interconnected system is such that it is impossible to separate the
waste waters flowing from different households. It is also
impossible to shut off the waste water treatment service being
provided to one household without affecting other connected
households. The waste water treatment service, therefore has the
characteristics of a public good. The good is non-rival in that
consumption of waste water treatment by one party does not
exclude the consumption of the same unit by another person. The
waste water treatment service also has the characteristics of non-
excludability in that if the service is provided, the producer (in this
case, the municipality) is unable to prevent anyone from consuming
the service or good. For instance, municipalities can not exclude
49. Rep. on Construction Grants Program, 1981, supra note 43, at 12.
50. Interview With Manager, Maiden, West Virginia, supra note 39.
51. Id. The average sewer bill was $22.50 a month.
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households that have not paid for waste water treatment service
from benefiting from the service. Households that have not paid
user fees continue to utilize waste water treatment service and
continue to benefit from clean waterways. Clean waterways are an
end result of waste water treatment. Knowing that they would
benefit from the provision of the good to other consumers that are
willing and able to pay for the good, some consumers seek to be
free riders. Hoping that services will be provided to other
consumers that are willing and able to pay, some consumers that
have not paid have the incentive not to reveal their true level of
willingness to pay for the service.
To coerce financially capable consumers to pay for waste
water treatment services, some states, including West Virginia,
have enacted laws penalizing such customers52 By shutting off or
discontinuing the water services, the consumer is prevented from
generating waste water. The Code, inter alia, authorizes districts
in collaboration with water companies to disconnect the water
supply of a consumer who has failed to pay user fees for sewer
services for a period of sixty days after the fee becomes due and
payable. Owners, tenants or occupants have a duty under section
16-13A-9 to pay rates and charges for the district sewer plants
from and after the date of receipt of notice that such facilities are
available.5 3 The Malden Public Service District revealed a great
improvement in their billing and collection system after this section
of the Code came into effect.
Unlike larger communities, small districts normally face
obstacles to funding waste water treatment services, especially as
they lack the economies of scale that make such services
affordable. Accordingly, the per household costs for waste water
treatment facilities are often relatively high in small communities
compared to larger districts, because the former cannot take
advantage of economies of scale.
53. See Rhodes v. Malden Public Service District, 301 S.E.2d 601 (W.Va. 1983).
52. W. Va. Code § 16-13A-9 (1991).
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Unfair System of Determining Eligibility for Federal Grants:
The system of issuing grants was unfair to small
communities. In allocating federal grants, federal regulations
authorized states to give major priority to communities with the
greatest discharge problems,54 regardless of their ability to pay the
cost of dealing with the pollution. In providing state grants,
states chose to provide supplementary state subsidies to cities that
were already receiving federal funds rather than to provide monies
to those unfunded districts.
Hence, small communities were not on the priority list and
did not receive a fair proportion of construction grants because the
funds went to larger communities with large facilities and large
quantities of discharge. 6 For instance, small cities represented 38
percent of the national population in the United States, but received
only 19 percent of the grant money between 1972 and 1980."
Large communities represented 31 percent of the total population,
but received 47 percent of the grant monies during the same
period. 8 Such large communities received more than their fair
54. A community that discharges beyond the limit stated in its permit is more
likely to receive federal or State funding to amend the violation even if the
pollution was exacerbated by negligence on the part of the community in not
spending any money to amend the problem. The preferential treatment given to
such a negligent community is unfair to another district that has spent money to
correct the violation but needs financial assistance to ensure sustainability in the
operation and maintenance of its facilities. Other factors considered in allocating
federal grants include the existing population affected and the need to preserve
the environment and high quality water.
55. 40 C.F.R. § 35.915(a)(1) (1987); 40 C.F.R. § 35.915(a)(iv) (1987). States
are permitted to consider the special needs of small and rural communities. But
the state shall not consider the project area's developmental needs not related to
pollution abatement.
56. EPA, 1990 Preliminary Draft Strategy for Municipal Waste Water
Treatment-Funding, Office of Water and Waste Management, (Jan. 1981).
57. GAO 1992 Revolving Funds Report, supra note 11, at 37.
58. Id.
CLEAN WATER ACT
share of grant money for a number of reasons including the
existence in larger communities of the necessary technical staff to
get projects to the construction phase. Besides, the effects of
substandard water quality were greater in larger communities and
EPA put more pressure on such districts to comply. 9
Furthermore, due to a number of factors including
substantial delays in issuing federal funds and in the facilities
planning process of the grants program, 60 less than 15 percent of
the total funds ($18 billion) authorized by Congress for the period
between 1973 and 1975 were actually spent.6' The
implementation of the entire grant process 62 for treatment facilities
that cost less than $1 million dollars takes approximately 8 years
while the process for projects that cost over $50 million takes over
11.55 years. 63 With inflation, construction costs increase, making
it more difficult for local governments to afford the installation of
treatment facilities. As studies have shown, between 1970 and
59. 1990 Preliminary Draft Strategy for Municipal Waste Water Treatment-
Funding.
60. Before the municipality (applicant) can be eligible to receive a federal grant,
the Administrator (from EPA) has to be satisfied that the municipality has gone
through the three stages of the grants program. The three steps include stage one
facilities planning which involves an examination of the project needs and
alternatives; step two (design stage) which entails the preparation of construction
drawings and specifications; stage three (construction) which involves actual
POTW installation. 40 C.F.R. § 35.903 (1983).
61. National Commission on Water Quality, Staff Rep. (1976).
62. This includes the three main stages-facilities planning stage, design and
construction phase.
63. Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Concerning the
Performance of the Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants
Program): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Works and Transp., 97th
Cong. 1st Sess. 1754 (1981).
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1984, the price index for non-residential construction increased at
the rate of 9.8 percent annually.64
Moreover, in anticipation of receiving federal grants, some
local governments have delayed the construction and efficient
operation/maintenance of treatment plants. To facilitate the grants
program, attempts have been made to ensure that small
communities with simple treatment requirements receive a single
federal grant for installation of POTWs thereby avoiding the
aforementioned three step grant process. Hence, treatment works
that cost $8 million or less and serve a community consisting of
25,000 or less may receive such a single grant for the cost of
designing and building the waste water treatment facility.6 5
As a result of pressures to balance the budget and to bring
inflation66 under control, federal funding for the construction of
municipal facilities was reduced from about an average of $6
billion a year in the early 1970s (following the 1972 Act) to an
average of about $5 billion67 annually from 1979 through 1982.
President Nixon confiscated $9 billion of the $18 billion that had
been authorized by Congress under the Title II of CWA.68
Although the federal funds were subsequently released in
accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Train v. New York,69 the initial impoundment of the funds no
doubt hindered most municipalities from complying with the
secondary treatment standard by July 1, 1977.
64. Id. at 1529.
65. Section 203(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1283(a) (1988).
66. The annual rate of inflation during this period was 7.8 percent. Hearings
on Construction Grants Program, 1981, supra note 2, at 1529.
67. Id. According to experts, because of inflation, the value of $5 billion in
1977 had diminished to the extent that it was worth as little as $3.4 billion in
1972 dollars.
68. Supra note 63.
69. Train v. New York, 420 U.S 35 (1975).
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Additionally, Congress further exacerbated the money
shortage problem by appropriating less than the amount it had
authorized for fiscal year 1977 through 1982. For instance,
although a total of $25.5 billion was authorized for fiscal year 1977
through 1982,70 only $16.9 billion was actually appropriated
between 1977 and 1981.71 Between 1973 and 1982, the total
authorization for the federal construction grants program was
approximately $44 billion.72 Of the total amount ($44 billion),
$34 billion was obligated and $25 billion was actually spent
through 198 1.
7
Arguments Against Increase in Federal Grants; High Federal
Share of Construction Costs and Inadequate Local Share Resulting
in Lack of Local Incentive:
One justification for an increased federal role in financing
the construction of municipal treatment plants is that such funds are
necessary to induce municipalities to comply with federal
regulations requiring secondary treatment. 74 But some studies75
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1988). The total sum of $25.5 billion was distributed
accordingly: $1 billion for fiscal year 1977, $4.5 billion for fiscal year 1978,
and $5 billion annually for each fiscal year from 1979 through 1982. Id.
71. Instead of spending $5 billion in each year from 1977 to 1982, Congress
appropriated $4.2 in 1979, $3.4 billion in 1980, $3.2 billion in 1981. Ledbetter,
Dozier and Jordan, Funding Municipal Waste Water Facilities in Georgia, 10
Current Mun. Probs. 206, 208 (1983).
72. Fern Summer, Sewage Treatment: When the Federal Government Pulls the
Plug, Envtl. Forum 9 (April 1986). $38 billion was appropriated by Congress.
73. Id. Council on Environmental Quality, Envtl. Quality 83-84 (1982).
74. The percentage of population whose wastes received at least secondary
treatment (standard imposed by the 1972 Act) increased as a result of federal
funding from 4 percent in 1960 to 69 percent in 1982, ten years after the
enactment of the 1972 Act. Moreover, the percentage of people whose wastes
received no treatment dropped from 63 percent to 8 percent during the same
period. Council on Environmental Quality, 83-84 (1984).
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illustrating the displacement of municipal spending by federal cost
sharing, do not support the justification for providing such federal
funds to municipalities. For instance, in the sixties, local
governments financed most of the construction and operation costs
of sewage treatment facilities. Local government spending (capital
and operating costs) was between $4 billion and $5.5 billion a year,
compared with federal spending which was between $100 million
and $400 million annually.76 Municipalities accounted for 90
percent to 95 percent of total government spending. But between
1970 and 1977, federal grants to municipalities rose from $0.5
billion to $6.0 billion annually, while local capital spending
decreased from $4.0 billion to $1.5 billion.77 To supplement the
federal funds received by municipalities, some states covered
between 10 and 20 percent of construction costs. Hence,
communities were responsible for only 5 to 15 percent of such
costs.
Some municipalities used federal grants to reduce the local
and state financial burden for the construction of sewage treatment
facilities that would have been installed in any event.78 For
instance, local and state spending increased in 1972, but declined
75. James Jondrow and Robert A. Levy, The Displacement of Local Spending
for Pollution Control by Federal Construction Grants, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 174-78
(May 1984).
76. Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Efficient
Investments in Waste Water Treatment Plants 4 (June 1985). Some districts
spent between $3 billion and $4 billion a year to install the facilities.
77. Id. The figures are a reflection of the substitution of municipal spending by
federal grants. Total capital spending increased from between $4.0 billion and
$5.0 billion in the 1960s to between $6 billion and $8 billion in the 1970s. But
in the 1980s, total spending decreased primarily because of reduced federal
grants and decreased local spending.
78. Therefore, progress and improvement in waste water treatment cannot be
attributed solely to federal financial aid. James Jondrow and Robert A. Levy,
The Displacement of Local Spending for Pollution Control by Federal
Construction Grants, 74 Am. Econ. 1lev. 174-78 (May 1984).
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by more than 50 percent by 1982, ten years after the creation of
Title II of the CWA.79 In support of the evidence, an econometric
survey80 of federal and state spending revealed that each
additional dollar of federal spending resulted in a reduction of
municipal spending by 65 cents.
With local governments receiving such a high percentage of
federal grants,81 capital expenditures for federally aided treatment
plants were higher than necessary to achieve the required secondary
treatment, especially as the communities had a very weak incentive:
to monitor the engineering consultant's work; to invest in cost
effective design and technologies; to efficiently maintain and
operate the facility and to match the design capacity of the plant
with projected needs.82 For instance, in 1979, $3 million worth
of federal grants was used to finance expensive, overly complex
and sophisticated POTWs for 1350 residents in Greenville,
Maine. 3 Because of the facility's high operational costs and
frequent breakdowns, it (the equipment) was not accepted by the
municipality. Subsequently, the POTW was closed in 1979.84
Legal Requirements With Respect to PO7Ws and Federal
Grants:
Judicial measures were taken to ensure that districts would
not rely solely on receiving federal grants and would not use the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. When the federal government assumed financial responsibility for 75 percent
of construction costs of waste water treatment plants.
82. Surveys have confirmed that by substantially increasing the local share of
costs, capital costs could be reduced by as much as 30 percent. U.S Congress,
Congressional Budget Office, Efficient Investments in Waste Water Treatment
Plants (1985).
83. The design of the facility was inconsistent with community needs.
Environmental Quality, 1979 Annual Rep. 121 (1979).
84. Id.
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lack of such funds as an excuse for not complying with the
conditions specified in the CWA. For instance, a federal appellate
court stated in 1977 in State Water Control Board v. Train 5 that,
"section 301(b)(1)'s effluent limitations are on their face
unconditional; and no other provision indicates any link between
their enforceability and the timely receipt of federal assistance.
8 6
The principle has been adopted by other federal appellate courts
and district courts including a United States district court which
held, inter alia, in United States v. Blytheville87 that municipal
compliance with the secondary treatment requirement by 1988
should not be contingent on federal funding received.
Theoretically, municipalities were obliged to meet the 1988
deadline regardless of whether or not they had received federal
funding. But in practice, the EPA, in recognizing that sewage
construction is a highly capital intensive proposition, has not
prosecuted many violators ineligible to receive federal funding.88
Accordingly, the legal requirement has not deterred certain
municipal waste water dischargers from non-compliance. Arguing
that they are financially incapacitated, some municipalities are non-
chalant about their failure to make an effort to comply with the
CWA regulations. A survey illustrated that a local official said:
O.K., I have read the law, I know what it says, I
know what the State and federal government are
requiring of me. And I'm not going to do it. I
don't have the money, I don't have the support, I
don't have the need in my community to do it. I'm
just not going to do it. And by the time the EPA
85. 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977).
86. 559 F.2d at 924.
87. United States v. Blytheville, No. J-C-85-125 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 28, 1986).
88. Jeff Robertson, Municipal Compliance With the Clean Water Act, 90 West
Virginia L. Rev. 803 (1987).
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figures out I didn't do it and gets around to
enforcing against me, I'll be dead. 9
Legislative Response to Lack of Local Incentive; the Emergence of
SRFs; Inequitable Mode of Determining Eligibility For SRFs:
Furthermore, to increase the incentive for local governments
to invest in more cost effective, innovative and alternative
technology, Congress introduced a number of measures, including
a reduction of the federal share of conventional construction costs
and an increase in the federal share of construction of innovative
and alternative technology. 9° Additionally, the 1981 Municipal
Waste Water Treatment Construction Grants Amendments reduced
the federal share for the construction of conventional technology
from 75 percent?' to 55 percent while the federal share for
building innovative and alternative technology was reduced from
85 percent to 75 percent.92  Authorizations were reduced from
between $4 billion and $6 billion a year (prior to 1982) to $2.4
billion a year for fiscal years 1982 through 1985.93 If innovative
89. Margaret E. Kriz, Effluent, Not Affluent, 21 Nat'l. J. 740, 742 (1989).
90. The figure was ten percent more than the federal share of conventional
technology. The federal share of capital costs for alternative technology was
initially 85 percent as opposed to 75 percent for conventional facilities. Section
1282 (a)(2) provided that after September 30, 1981, those communities that apply
for Title II construction grants who use innovative and alternative technologies
are entitled to a federal share of construction costs that is at least 20 percent
greater than the grant allocated for conventional POTWs. 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(2)
(1988). The total federal contribution in this case would not exceed 85 percent
of total installation costs.
91. For programs that started before 1985, the federal government continued to
fund 75 percent of construction costs of conventional sewage treatment plants.
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1988). The federal share of construction costs (before
October 1, 1981) of such alternative and innovative technology was 85 percent.
CWA § 202(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(2) (1988).
93. Congress of the United States, Budget Office, Efficient Investments in
Waste Water Treatment Plants 3 (June 1985).
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and alternative systems failed within two years of completion, the
municipality was entitled to receive 100 percent of all replacement
costs, provided that the failure to meet design performance
specifications was not due to negligence and had considerably
increased capital, operation and maintenance costs. 94  Some
communities took advantage of federal incentives. Starting in
1981, the EPA awarded 700 innovative and alternative grants worth
nearly $900 million.95 To encourage the development and use of
innovative and alternative technology, the act96 provided that
before an applicant (municipality) can be eligible for a federal
grant, the municipality must demonstrate that innovative and
alternative technologies have been fully surveyed, evaluated and
studied.
To reduce the amount of federal funds spent and to
encourage cost effectiveness, Congress restricted the number of
projects that would be eligible for federal financial aid.97
Pursuant to section 218 of the CWA,98 federal funding to
municipalities for the construction of sewage treatment facilities
was contingent upon cost effectiveness and all POTWs were
required to be the most economical and cost effective combination
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(3) (1988).
95. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 1526 (1981).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(5) (1988).
97. In accordance with § 201(g)(1) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(1) (1988),
on or after October 1, 1984, federal grants would only be appropriated for
"projects for secondary treatment or more stringent treatment, or any cost
effective alternative thereto, new interceptors and appurtenances and infiltration-
inflow correction." Office of Water, EPA, Financing Water Pollution Control,
the States Role, (Draft) 5 (1982). Pursuant to the CWA § 201, 33 U.S.C. § 1286
(1988), Congress reduced federal funding for unnecessarily complex and
advanced waste treatment technology and for advanced secondary treatment
projects.
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1298 (1988).
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of devices and systems used in the storage, treatment, recycling and
reclamation of municipal sewage. Federal funding was
discontinued for waste water treatment projects that exceeded the
current needs of the community. 99  Accordingly, the POTW
reserve capacities that exceeded municipal needs were supposed to
be financed by local communities. 00
However, most communities'' still prefer to use more
complex and unaffordable waste water systems.
10 2
Municipalities, including engineering consultants, regulators and
administrative officials as well as users (members of the public),
hardly trust low cost waste water treatment systems.
10 3
Engineering consultants would rather have conventional sewage
treatment plants which they can design and control."°4
Furthermore, regulators and administrative officials are reluctant to
face the economic and political risks of installing alternative
technology. 0 5 Hence, there is a preference for sewage treatment
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1284(a)(5) (1988).
100. Id.
101. The Marsh land (wetland) system, Arcata, Humboldt County, California.
102. Rep. On Construction Grants Program, 1981, supra note 43, at 41.
103. The Marsh Land System of Sewage Treatment is used in Arcata, Humboldt
County in California. 94 acres of newly created wetlands is used to provide low
cost wastewater treatment technology. Sometimes after treatment, the water is
clear and adequate for discharge into the Humboldt Bay. Being cheap and easier
to build, the Marsh Land system should be economically attractive particularly
to small poor communities with resource constraints. However, this low cost
system requires 20 times the area or space used to install a high technology
system. For example, between 2,000 and 3,000 acres of land would be needed
to serve 8 million people with the Marsh treatment system. To deal with the
problem of unavailability of land space, wetlands, degraded industrial/commercial
property or degraded salt water marshes can be used to treat sewage.
104. Rep. on Construction Grants Program, 1981, supra note 43, at 41.
105. Id.
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technology that has been proven in terms of process of control, and
an insistence on chlorinating water after low cost technology
systems have been installed.
Additionally, to create more efficient' 6 government
investment in waste water treatment facilities, Congress established
the State Revolving Funds (SRFs) under Title VI of the Clean
Water Act as amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987.107 The
legislators envisaged that with the SRFs, the local government
would develop user fees that better reflect operation, maintenance
and replacement costs. Furthermore, the local government would
assume more responsibility for the cost of plants and would seek
less costly alternatives to meeting their needs. The borrowed funds
were to be used to install, expand or upgrade the facilities as long
as the plant was publicly owned. The only partnerships that are
available for SRF financing are those that retain a public
ownership, such as the contract operations. The restriction of
public ownership limits communities in their choice of
public/private partnership options.
States were required to set up capital programs through
grants received from the federal government. As a condition to
receiving capitalization grants from the federal government, states
were compelled to provide matching amounts equal to 20 percent
of the total grant and to use the money for a number of services,
including the construction of waste water treatment facilities.
106. Congress was concerned that federal grants were providing inappropriate
incentives to local governments, which led to underpriced wastewater treatment
services and dependence on federal aid for constructing and replacing facilities.
107. Pub. L. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1988)). Congress shifted the responsibility for financing more than $83.5 billion
in waste water treatment needs from the federal government to the States. The
federal government was required to provide $8.4 billion in capitalization grants
for State Revolving Funds over six years (between 1989 and 1994). When the
capitalization grants program comes to an end, it will be the first time since 1956
that the federal government has not had a major role in financing waste water
treatment plants.
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Subsequently, states were expected to finance municipal
projects with increased state grants and loans."'8 States were to
raise some funds through the issuance of bonds and the monies
generated was to be loaned to municipalities at a low interest rate.
The municipalities were to pay back the monies borrowed into the
capitalization funds within 20 years. Unfortunately, low cost
financing available through sources like the SRFs make it very
difficult for the private sector to compete with public financing.
Hence, the private sector has lost all incentive to pursue public-
private partnerships that include private ownership.
Small districts were and still are at a disadvantage when
competing with larger communities for loans, especially as they do
not have exemplary credit ratings and may represent higher credit
risks because of their small revenue base. 1°9 A large percentage
of SRFs are loaned to larger communities, primarily because they
are viewed as a better credit risk. For instance, although 92
percent of the states in the survey considered health and
environmental needs in offering loan assistance, most states ranked
a community's readiness to start project construction and its ability
to repay the loan as the second and third most important
factors. ° Many small districts, unlike large ones, cannot afford
to pay back the loan even at the low interest rate. EPA studies
reveal that households in smaller communities face higher user
charges as a percentage of household income than those in larger
cities."
108. Office of Water, EPA, Financing Water Pollution Control: The State Role
(Draft) 37-38 (1982).
109. Supra note 53.
110. Id.
111. The Municipal Sector Study: Impacts of Environmental Regulations on
Municipalities, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, EPA (Sept. 1988).
EPA, A Preliminary Analysis of the Public Costs of Environmental Protection:
1981-2000, Administration and Resources Management (May 1990).
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Accordingly, small communities cannot afford to raise the
necessary user fees to repay a loan. For example, Montana
officials reported that in a small town in the state, raw sewage was
overflowing septic tanks into a creek, but the community could not
afford to build a collection system and treatment lagoon to replace
the septic tanks. While the town's residents could afford monthly
user fees of only $12 per household, they (the district) could not
afford the cost of an improved system which would have increased
user charges to at least $42 a month per household. Similarly, the
state of Colorado unsuccessfully tried to increase state taxes in
order to finance a capital improvement bond for waste water
treatment and water supply projects."'
The restriction on the use of SRFs 13 for purchasing land
has adversely affected communities, particularly those small
districts that are in need of sufficient land to replace septic tank
systems with centralized treatment and collection facilities. Thus,
loans are more likely to be used by larger cities with existing
sewage treatment plants, especially if the loan rates are very low.
Furthermore, when the SRF was established, emphasis was
on ensuring that the loan was paid back quickly so that the
revolving fund money could be used for other purposes.
Consequently, most small communities were left out because of
their inability to repay loans. The aforementioned system of
determining eligibility for loans gave a competitive advantage to
larger communities whose immediate needs were not as great as
those of small communities."
4
112. EPA, Office of Management and Budget's Circular No. A102, Attachment
N.
113. The cost of purchasing easements and rights of way often necessary for
sewage construction are not eligible for SRF assistance.
114. The EPA should consider seeking legislative changes to Title VI of the
Clean Water Act including creating a new fund exclusively for small community
waste water treatment, drinking water and solid waste management as well as
extending the SRF loan term beyond 20 years to help small communities repay
their loans. EPA should encourage States to vary interest rates on the basis of
economic need and to provide supplemental grants for hardship.
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Discouragement of Privatization:
Therefore, privatization is an attractive option in smaller
financially depressed communities, particularly those starting from
scratch and having a high bond rating. 115 Privatization or having
a utility operated and managed by a private enterprise is not a new
concept.!16  What is new is its application to the waste water
treatment sphere. Privatization of waste water treatment would
allow local governments to capitalize on advantages unique to the
115. Privatization and user fees are effective ways to raise capital for
wastewater treatment facilities and to streamline operations. Jonathan Gifford,
Infrastructure, Toward the 21st Century, 17 Wilson Quarterly 40 (Winter 1993).
Pursuant to EPA's 1988 needs survey, modernization and expansion of existing
wastewater treatment plants and sewer systems are expected to cost as much as
$110 billion over the next 20 years. Being concerned about the shortage of
municipal funds including the poor state of publicly owned wastewater treatment
plants, on April 30, 1992, Former President George Bush signed an executive
order to promote private investment in state and local infrastructure. Alan B.
Nicholas, Executive Order to Expedite Waste Water Privatization, Water
Environment Federation, Water Environment Technology 35 (July 1992). EPA
is expected to issue regulations to implement the order. There is ambiguity as
to the effect, if any, the order would have on the future eligibility for state
revolving fund assistance. Some experts confirm that privatization would enable
cities to save substantial sums of money. For instance, municipalities that
received a 75 percent federal grant on a $40 million plant in the late 1970s
would save about $15 million. Statement by Steven Steckler, Senior Manager
Price Waterhouse Transportation and Utilities Finance Group, in Water
Environment and Technology 35 (July 1992).
116. Jonathan Gifford, Infrastructure, Toward the 21st Century, 17 Wilson
Quarterly 42 (Winter 1993). Privatization has been applied in the development
of other infrastructural services including water supply, railways, electricity and
roads. The government has played an important supporting role in encouraging
the private sector in this regard. For instance, in the 19th century, the
construction of the railroad system was largely carried out by private industries.
America's $260 billion telecommunications infrastructure of copper and
fiberoptic cables, switching systems and satellites has been built through private
investment. In recent years, private investors have supplied (wired) 50 million
American households with cable TV. Every year electric utilities invest between
$10 and $15 billion in the installation of new plants and equipment.
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private sector in owning, building and/or operating capital intensive
facilities.
Privatization brings together public and private investors in
a joint effort to provide efficient services. The private owner gains
a business opportunity for a service contract and earns a favorable
return on its investment but assumes most of the risks involved in
the financing, construction and operation of the sewage treatment
facility. Alternatively, the industry could share most of the risks
and liabilities with the municipality. The district would be relieved
of the problem of financing and overseeing operation and
maintenance of a sewage facility. The city would, however, have
a say in setting user charges and in solving customer problems.
Privatization would: reduce federal and state involvement in
local government's responsibility to provide services; potentially
lower sewer rates; provide continued assurance to the municipality
of proper installation, efficient operation and maintenance of plants;
offer more flexibility to communities on financing; provide a cost
effective design, construction and/or operation alternatives;
minimize lengthy construction delays; furnish significant economies
of scale and produce innovative concepts.
Privatization has been successfully implemented in
Massachusetts. For instance, to reduce a $5 million budget deficit,
the city of Brockton, Massachusetts entered into a ten-year contract
with Professional Services Group of Houston, Texas to operate and
maintain its plant.' 7 The private company hired all the city's
employees and saved the city $5 million over the life of the
contract.
However, the impediments to the development of
public/private partnerships include the nonexcludable nature
(characteristics of a public good) of waste water treatment service;
the concern about regulation and overregulation of price by public
utility commissions; the aforementioned restriction of public
ownership and disincentive for private participation introduced by
the SRF; lack of state enabling legislation; wariness on the part of
117. Volume 6, No. 1 National Small Flows, West Virginia University (Jan.
1992).
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the public to turn over traditionally local services to an outside
company; limitation on the sale or incumbrance of existing waste
water treatment plants that were financed by federal funds and the
adverse economic impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Since some consumers can utilize and benefit from waste
water treatment service without payment, there is an incentive not
to pay for the service. The nonexcludable characteristic of waste
water treatment service prevents private market forces from
functioning, where a provider of service cannot ensure that only
those that pay for the good can benefit from the service. There is
an argument that such public goods should be provided by the
government and for payment of such services through taxes.
However, the private sector may be encouraged to provide such
anti-pollution services especially if there is the existence of markets
in clean water. Market failure results partly from the inability to
define and enforce property rights. According to Coase's theorem,
externalities (such as pollution) do not give rise to misallocation of
resources, provided there are no transaction costs and given
property rights that are well defined and enforceable. For instance,
if property rights are well defined and allocated, the holder of the
right to clean water can grant to the polluter, the right to pollute in
return for some financial compensation. By negotiating a mutually
beneficial solution with the polluter, the producer and consumer of
the externality internalize the externality and arrive at a pareto-
relevant externality. The pareto-relevant externality occurs when the
extent of activity may be modified in such a way that the
externally-affected person can be made better off without the acting
party being made worse off. Coase's theorem has been rejected by
most hard core environmentalists who strongly believe that the
optimum level of pollution should be zero. Such environmentalists
believe that granting the right to pollute to the polluter undermines
the goal of ensuring that the waterways are not polluted.
The private entity is not classified as a public utility
permitting it to enjoy the benefit of freedom from strict state
control but unable to benefit from the tax allowances available to
public entities. The EPA requires that the title of a federally
19941
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funded facility cannot be encumbered by a private party." 8 If
the facility needs to be expanded or upgraded, a private-public
partnership could not be used without reimbursement of federal
funds. Despite the dilapidated condition" 9 of sewage facilities
in small communities, in particular, it was impossible for private
investors to provide a competitive alternative for such communities.
The legislature was concerned that the investment tax credit
and depreciation schedule that existed prior to 1986 resulted in
investors making decisions that were not based on the viability of
projects, but on the opportunity to obtain tax shelters and benefits.
Therefore, the 1986 Tax Reform Act and the 1987 Deficit
Reduction Act significantly reduced the use of accelerated
depreciation, eliminated certain investment tax credits120 and
limited the availability of tax exempt industrial development bonds.
Additionally, the 1986 legislation decreased the availability of tax
exempt financing of private sector investment.
Prior to 1986, private investors were able to utilize a ten
percent investment tax credit (ITC) for financing waste water
treatment plants. The Tax Acts of 1982, 1983 and 1984 provided
benefits associated with privatization, including Accelerated Cost
Recovery (ACRS) depreciation, an Investment Tax Credit (ITC),
and the deductibility of interest on the debt associated with such
projects. The credit enabled the private investor to offset tax
liability dollar for dollar up to the first $25,000 and 85 percent in
118. But on April 30, 1992, then President George Bush signed an order
relaxing recoupment practices and repealing the restrictive requirement that a
municipality must repay the proportionate federal share of the plant's fair market
value if it (the district) decided to sell its sewage treatment plant to a private
investor. The order required State and Local Governments to repay only the
depreciated value of the grant and to recover their original investment, including
transaction costs. Alan B. Nicholas, supra note 115, at 35.
119. Alan B. Nicholas, supra note 115.
120. Prior to 1986, there was a 10 percent investment tax credit for
infrastructure projects.
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excess of $25,000. '2 ' Tax credits that were not used in a given
year could be carried against tax liability in preceding or
subsequent years. In other words, ITCs would offset operating
costs. Furthermore, prior to 1986, the accelerated cost recovery
system(ACRS) depreciation provided a method whereby the capital
investment in a facility could be recovered rapidly through
accelerated depreciation. Most waste water treatment facilities
have an economic useful life of 20 to 30 years. ACRS allowed for
much of the facility to be depreciated over a five to eight year
period. But the 1986 tax legislation and the 1987 Act made the
allowances for depreciation less attractive to investors by extending
the number of years over which plant and equipment can be
depreciated. The elimination of ITCS and the significant limitation
of the use of ACRS reduced the incentive for the private sector to
invest in publicly owned waste water treatment facilities.
Initially, much of state and local governments' investment
in waste water treatment facilities was financed through the
issuance of tax-exempt bonds. For such bonds, the governments
paid below-market rates of interest to bondholders because the
interest the bonds earned was tax exempt. But local governments
were criticized for using proceeds from tax-exempt bonds for
projects, such as shopping malls, that provided only indirect public
benefits."' Hence, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 placed
restrictions on the issuance of tax-exempt bonds, thereby creating
barriers to financing public infrastructure.'
2 3
Additionally, the 1986 tax code introduced a two percent
cost-of-issuance restriction on tax exempt private activity bonds
121. Supra note 13.
122. According to the data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, in
1985 about 33 percent of outstanding long term tax exempt bonds were used for
private activities. Anthony Commission on Public Financing, Preserving the
Federal-State-Local Partnership: The Role of Tax-Exempt Financing, 16
(Washington, D.C Oct. 1989).
123. Id.
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that finance environmental facilities. 24 There was an increase in
the cost of borrowing with private-activity bonds and limitations on
advanced refunding of such bonds. 25  The Act restricted
arbitrage earnings (the interest earned by investing in tax exempt
bonds proceeds).2 6 The Act introduced a volume cap which
limited the amount of funding available in a given state each year
for environmental programs. The restrictions made tax exempt
bonds more expensive and less available for private/public
partnerships. To deal with the problem, environmental bonds
should be reclassified as governmental bonds (which cost less to
issue than private activity tax-exempt bonds), provided that their
proceeds are used primarily to finance public-purpose
environmental projects. Without encouraging the development of
public/private partnerships, communities, particularly small
districts, will continue to be financially and technically incapable
of complying with the CWA.
124. Pursuant to the 1986 code, a volume cap was placed by the State, thereby
limiting the amount of private activity bonds (tax exempt) that can be issued.
But prior to 1986, tax exempt financing was available to the private sector for
certain types of industrial development. Borrowing funds at lower tax exempt
rates assisted the private entity to charge fees for services that were comparable
to municipal rates. Vol. 6, No. 3, National Small Flows, West Virginia
University (July 1992).
125. Id.
126. Id. Government earnings on bond proceeds is restricted to 0.125 percent
above the initial yield on the bonds.
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Judicial and Local 27 Attempts to Bypass Restrictive State Laws
on Financing Mechanisms:
128
Acknowledging that state restrictions on financing
environmental projects can adversely affect the level of POTW
compliance, some courts have recommended and rigorously sought
ways of satisfying the financial needs of POTWs. 129  For
instance, federal courts have overridden state laws on financing
mechanisms. In United States v. District of Colombia,'3" the
regional commission failed to abide by the order of the district
court requiring the commission to purchase a sludge composting
site and to allocate funds for the acquisition of such a site in its
state budget."' Consequently, the federal appeals court affirmed
the order of the district court requiring the state agency to ignore
state law on the procedures required for budget approval and to
include certain funds in its budget. Rejecting a tenth amendment
argument, the court of appeals held that the federal interest in water
pollution control was vital and so well established that any tenth
amendment argument limiting federal infringement on state
sovereignty did not apply.
32
127. State law in St. Louis required voter approval before the district could raise
money. Hence, in 1987, voters of St. Louis successfully turned down a
referendum on a charter amendment to allow the sewer district to issue revenue
bonds to pay for a $400 million capital improvement program. Such
improvements were required to meet the sewer district's agreement with State
environmental officials. St. Louis Post Dispatch, Nov. 5, 1987, at IA Col 3.
128. Courts have tried to override State restrictions on the issuance of bonds.
129. Courts have limited authority to order other branches of government to
expend or raise funds for projects.
130. 654 F. 2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
1
131. Id. The District court ordered that the funds be restored to the State
budget.
132. Id. at 806-07. The federal court also enjoined county officials from
complying with the State order that would have prohibited the purchase of the
sludge composting site which the city had been ordered by the district court to
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Similarly, the courts have made successful attempts to
abrogate state restrictions that blocked the issuance of bonds to
finance construction projects. For instance, in People v. Sanitary
District of Decatur,133 the parties entered into a consent decree
that authorized the sewage district to issue bonds to finance its $25
million share of a $107 million construction project. The decree
permitted the parties to bypass voter approval for issuing the bonds,
which would have been required under state law.
134
However, in United States v. City of Detroit,35 the district
court unsuccessfully ordered the state to hold its federal grants for
a financially incapacitated city. 136 In reversing the order of the
district court, the appeals court held that the order was
unconstitutional 37 and would have had a negative impact on
other similarly situated communities increasing reliance on federal
funds and making compliance difficult.
In non environmental cases (school segregation), courts
have used direct methods of ordering the financing necessary to
achieve compliance with an order. For instance, in Missouri v.
purchase.
133. No. 82-3375 (C.D. mH. Dec. 29, 1982).
134. Voter approval would have been politically hard to obtain.
135. 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
136. The city had claimed that it was financially incapable of complying with
the CWA regulations. The appeals court reversed the order of the district court
on separation of powers grounds. The decision of the district court violated the
doctrine of separation of powers primarily because under the federal grants
program, Congress is authorized to allocate monies to the State and the latter is
required to dispense the funds to communities in accordance with federal
regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (1988).
137. Id. Under the federal program, Congress allocates funds to the State. 33
U.S.C. § 1281(g) (1988).
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Jenkins,"3 8 the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 vote, held
that a federal court possesses the power to tax in certain
circumstances. 13 9  Although this case involved compliance with
an order for school desegregation, the same principle could be
applied to a court order that required POTWs to comply with CWA
regulations.
Summary of Main Points:
Small communities, in particular, were financially hard hit
by the deficiencies in the modes of financing and investing in
public waste water treatment facilities. Given the nonexcludable
nature of the provision of waste water treatment service, some
financially capable households have had an incentive not to pay
user fees, not to reveal willingness to pay and to attempt to free
ride. In this respect, the private sector lacks the incentive to invest
in the provision of such services.
The shortcomings in the mode of financing and investing in
public facilities include problems in the implementation of Title II
138. This case involved the segregated Kansas City, Missouri school system.
495 U.S. 33 (1990).
139. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). In this case, the United States
District Court was concerned that certain provisions of the Missouri State law
limiting local property tax levies would ban the Kansas City school district from
raising the monies necessary to comply with the order to maintain a school
system free from racial discrimination. Therefore, the district court, in hoiding
that the Kansas city school district had exhausted other possible sources of
revenue, overruled the State restriction and ordered the school district to increase
its property tax levy above the limit required by State law through the fiscal year
1991-1992. In upholding the decision of the district court, the Supreme Court
noted that respect for the integrity of Local Governmental units should be of
paramount consideration in evaluating the decision of the district court.
Following the principle laid down in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County, the Supreme Court held that "a court order directing a local
government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial Act within the power
of a federal court." Hence, a federal court may order a local government with
taxing authority to levy taxes in excess of State statutory limits when there is a
constitutional ground for not observing State limits. Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S 218, 233 (1964).
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and Title IV of the CWA. The pitfalls of the Title II program
include: persistent delays in administering federal grants; an unfair
system of allocating federal grants which works to the detriment of
small communities; local resistance to the program and the
impoundment of authorized federal funds.
However, the allocation of sufficient federal grants did not
always induce municipal compliance. The availability of a high
proportion of federal grants in relation to local funding has even
had certain adverse impacts on municipal compliance including the
reduction and displacement of municipal spending and the
disincentive for districts to acquire less complex and more cost
effective technology and to efficiently operate and maintain such
treatment plants.
Despite laws requiring that municipalities comply with
secondary treatment regulations by 1988 whether or not they
receive federal funding, in practice, the EPA has recognized that
the grants program is highly capital intensive and has not instituted
proceedings against many financially strapped violators.
Furthermore, the pitfalls in the Title IV program include:
a biased system of allocating loans which favors larger
communities whose needs are not as great as those of smaller
communities; the lack of market approaches in the development of
publicly owned waste water treatment facilities;"40  the
disincentive for private involvement in financing and investing in
public waste water treatment facilities; and the restrictions on the
use of SRFs for the purchase of land which limits the availability
of land to replace septic tanks with centralized treatment facilities
and collection systems.
140. See text accompanying notes 114-25, Discouragement of Privatization.
CLEAN WATER ACT
SECTION THREE
DEFICIENCIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL
NPDES Permit System and NMPS.
Whether or not they are financially distressed, municipalities
are subject to Clean Water Act enforcement provisions.'
Congress delegated authority to the EPA to promulgate rules and
regulations to effectively administer the Clean Water Act. The
EPA sets minimum standards and oversees compliance with the
CWA (CWA section 303, 402. 33 U.S.C. § 1313, 1342). The Act
contains non-preemptive provisions. Accordingly, Congress
emphasized that states can set more stringent standards than the
EPA to protect their citizens' health and the environment.
42
141. Supra notes 82. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1988). Section 309(a)(1) of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988), states that any person violating § 1311
(secondary treatment deadlines) or § 1342 (NPDES permit requirements) shall
be subject to its provisions. "Person" includes municipalities.
142. Section § 403(b) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C § 1342 (1988). The means of
achieving water quality goals is by establishing and enforcing a system of
technology-based effluent standards. The technology-based standards define the
maximum quantities of pollutants each source would be allowed to discharge.
Therefore, there is no need to investigate the assimilative capacity of water
quality as was the case under the 1965 Water Quality Act. Section 101 of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) sets goals which called for the achievement of
fishable and swimmable waters throughout the nation by 1983. The Act required
all municipal and industrial waste waters to be treated before being discharged
into waterways. Id. The objectives of the CWA are to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation's waters." Id. To date,
these goals have not been achieved.
1994]
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When the districts fail to comply with the standards laid
down in the NPDES permit 143 limitations,' 44 either the EPA or
143. § 301(b)(1) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(1). The National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) is one of the most important pieces of
regulatory machinery under the Clean Water Act. The effluent limits are written
into the NPDES permit. 33 USC § 1342 (1988). The permits limit the allowable
discharges of individual polluters to the quantities that are consistent with
relevant technology-based effluent limitation. Information provided to me by the
EPA, Washington, D.C., April 1990. The permits must be obtained before the
discharge of pollutants from any point source into waterways in the United
States. Any material that is dumped into waterways constitutes a "pollutant."
Any discharge point such as a pipe, ditch, container or vehicle is considered a
point source. The CWA prohibited municipalities and industries from
discharging pollutants into waterways without NPDES permits or contrary to the
permit requirements provided that all treatment plants in existence on July 1,
1977, shall achieve effluent limitations based upon "secondary treatment" as
defined by the Administrator of EPA. "Secondary treatment" refers to sewage
treatment that is capable of removing up to 90 percent of all organic matter and
solids in sewage prior to discharge. Office of Water and Programs Operations,
EPA, Primer For Waste Water Treatment 5 (1980).
144. The EPA was empowered to establish effluent limitations as regulations
within one year of the date of enactment. With regard to the EPA's task of
translating effluent limitations into specific reductions and issuing permits to
thousands of pollution dischargers, the agency reported that as of October 1982,
it had issued slightly more than 68,000 permits consisting of more than 52,000
to industrial and other non municipal sources and 16,000 to municipal treatment
plants. GAO, Waste Water Dischargers Are Not Complying With EPA Pollution
Control Permits, 2 (1983). But the EPA was required to turn over the
responsibility to individual States when the States met certain conditions. §
402(b) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988), allows States to administer
their own permits. Once the EPA approves a State permit program, the agency
must suspend its own issuance of permits in that State while the State assumes
the responsibility of administration and enforcement of permits against non
compliant offenders. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1988). A State may issue a POTW
its own permit imposing more rigorous requirements under State law. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(f) (1988). EPA must approve the State permit unless the administrator
determines that the program fails to meet the applicable legal requirements. For
instance, EPA has to be satisfied that the state program is adequately staffed and
funded and designed to meet minimum EPA standards. By November 1988, 39
states and territories had taken over the responsibility for issuing permits and
enforcing their terms. Where enforcement by the state is unsatisfactory, the EPA
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the equivalent state agency, 145 is authorized to issue an
administrative order146 or refer the POTW to the Justice
Department for judicial action. 47  Additionally, the citizen
suit1 8 provision of the Act empowers "any citizen to bring civil
may intervene by administering and enforcing NPDES permits in the State.
United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 739-40 (D. Del. 1981). In
enforcing the requirements of NPDES permits and federal law, the EPA may not
impose more stringent requirements than State law may impose.
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1988). Where there is a violation of a NPDES
permit limitation, the EPA will notify both the violator and the State of such a
finding. Upon receiving such notice from the EPA, the State must institute
enforcement proceedings. If State action is not commenced within 30 days of
the EPA notice, the EPA may initiate appropriate enforcement action.
146. An administrative order may be applied in a number of ways. For
instance, it may take the form of a notice of violation to a non-compliant POTW,
a command for compliance, or an extension of the POTW's compliance schedule.
147. Remedies available include civil penalties, fines paid into environmental
project funds, criminal sanctions, sewer moratoria, injunctive relief and the
common law remedy of receivership. EPA, Office of Water Program Operations,
National Municipal Policy and Strategy For the Construction Grants, NPDES
Permits, And Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act 6 (1979). 33 U.S.C. §
1319 (1988). Non compliant municipal treatment plants may be blacklisted from
contracting with any federal agency.
148. Pursuant to § 505 of the CWA,
any citizen may commence a civil action on his behalf-
(1)"against any person [including (i) the United States, and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution] who
is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator of [EPA] or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation.
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988). Citizen suit provisions are viewed by legislators as an
effective policy and democratic instrument that allows "concerned citizens" to
remedy environmental pollution. 116 Cong. Rec. 32,903 (1970). Stewart, in an
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actions against anyone who is alleged to be in violation of... an
effluent standard or limitation under [the Act]. 1
Pursuant to the CWA, the self monitoring system requires
companies and municipalities to file Discharge Monitoring Reports
(DMRs) with regional EPA offices.' 50 The record keeping
system documents each individual polluter's specific violations of
regulatory standards and/or permits. Thus, the DMR system
enables enforcement agencies and interested individuals to keep
track of NPDES permit violations.
Being concerned about lack of progress 5' of districts in
complying with the CWA and in constructing sewage treatment
facilities in the 1970's and 1980's, the EPA established more
rigorous measures, particularly the National Municipal Policy
Strategy (NMPS),152 which outlined appropriate enforcement
responses where municipalities violated effluent limitations or
NPDES permit requirements.' 53  Local governments were
article published in the Harvard Law Review, defends citizen suits but is
sometimes skeptical about the merits of citizen enforcement. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667 (1975).
Third parties may also enforce requirements of State permits and laws in
accordance with State statutes giving them such a right. Minnesota
Environmental Rights Law, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116B (West 1987).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988). This includes violation of discharge permits.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1988).
151. See introduction. The deadline for achieving secondary treatment has been
extended twice. The initial deadline was extended from 1977 to 1983 and
subsequently from 1983 to July 1, 1988.
152. This policy was signed in January 1984 and was a reaffirmation of the
EPA's and the State's commitment in bringing all sewage treatment plants in the
United States into compliance with the law and making sure that the plants
remain in compliance.
153. Under the NMPS, enforcement officials may issue non-compliant
municipalities any of the following: a permit extension in accordance with §
301(i)(1), U.S.C. § 1311(i)(1) (1988); an administrative order setting forth a
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required to comply with the July 1, 1988 secondary treatment
mandate of the 1981 CWA Amendments.5 4  EPA reports
illustrate that following the implementation of the 1984 policy, 133
court cases were filed against non-compliant POTWs between that
mandatory schedule of compliance; or a notice of intent to initiate judicial action
that seeks to mandate satisfactory POTW performance. Where the municipality
is ineligible for a permit extension, a § 309(a)(5)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(A)
(1988), administrative order must be issued. The order must specify a schedule
up to the final date for satisfying secondary treatment standards. The schedule
does not require the POTW to achieve secondary treatment by the final date for
compliance. The municipalities that are subject to judicial action under the
Municipal Referral Priority System (MRPS) include: all POTWS that require
construction but are ineligible for a § 301(i)(1) extension and will not receive a
§ 309(a)(5)(A) administrative order; recipients of 301(i)(1) extensions,
enforcement compliance schedule letters, or administrative orders who
subsequently violate such extensions, schedule letters or orders; and POTWs that
have completed construction but are not meeting effluent limits or other permit
requirements. Referral priority depends on a number of factors including POTW
size, municipal population, POTW treatment level, health hazards, and past
operation and maintenance practices. EPA, Office of Water Program Operations,
National Municipal Policy and Strategy For the Construction Grants, NPDES
Permits, and Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act 38-40 (1979).
154. Furthermore, the NMPS echoed the aforementioned decision of the United
States courts that POTW compliance was not conditional on the receipt of federal
funding. See text accompanying notes 83-86. The only exceptions to the
requirement that municipalities must meet compliance by July 1, 1988, were
those cities that could prove that they were physically or financially hindered
from completing sewage treatment construction by the July 1, 1988, deadline.
But the NMPs made it clear that the cities that could prove financial and physical
incapacity were to abide by court enforceable schedules to achieve compliance
as quickly as possible. The EPA and the States were required to induce
compliance by strengthening their enforcement efforts including taking additional
measures against cities that refuse to cooperate to protect the health and
environment of their citizens. EPA administrator, Mr. Lee Thomas, commented
that his agency and the States have no intention of slowing their enforcement
efforts. Office of Water, EPA, Municipal Compliance With Clean Water Act
(July 27, 1988).
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year and 1988.255 The 133 law suits filed consisted of 118
claims against NMP facilities requiring construction and 15 cases
against NMP requiring improved operation and maintenance.
Consequently, there was some progress in municipal
compliance with the CWA between 1984 and 1988. The EPA
claims that 87% of all publicly owned treatment works (serving
108 million people) in the United States met the July 1, 1988
deadline for pollution cleanup.156 The remaining 13% of POTWs
were put on enforceable time schedules leading to compliance or
were in some phase of a judicial process leading to the
establishment of the timetables. There are currently 15,486
publicly owned treatment works in the United States consisting of
3,731 majors157 and 11,755 minors. 158  By July 1988, the level
of compliance among the total 3,731 majors rose from 60% (2,253
majors) in January 1984 (the date of implementation of the NMP)
to 89% (3308) by July 1, 1988. Similarly, the level of compliance
among the total 11,755 minors rose from 79% (9,257) in 1984 to
86% (10,083) in July 1, 1988. The remaining 11% (423) of all the
majors were out of compliance in July 1988 while 14% (1,672) of
all the minors did not achieve compliance by that same date. Of
the 423 majors that did not meet the requirements, 235 were on
155. Lee M. Thomas, Administrator, EPA, Municipal Compliance With the
Clean Water Act 3 (July 27, 1988).
156. Dave Ryan, EPA Environmental News, Office of Public Affairs, July
1988, at 1-2. 87 percent compliance has been achieved primarily through
voluntary compliance and through Federal and State enforcement efforts.
157. "Majors" are defined generally as plants designed to serve 10,000 or more
people and to process one million gallons or more of waste water a day.
158. "Minors" are all sewage treatment plants (other than the majors) which
provide service to a population of under 10,000 or a flow of under one million
gallons a day.
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enforceable compliance schedules set forth in an NPDES
permit, 1 9 while 188 were not on any schedule.'O Furthermore,
of the 1,672 minors that were unable to meet the requirements of
the CWA by July 1, 1988, 1,231 were on enforceable
schedules 161 while 441 were not on any schedule.' 62
Civil Penalties;163 Benefits and Drawbacks:
Observing the need for further improvement in the level of
municipal compliance, Congress established more stringent civil
penalties for violations of the CWA. Pursuant to the 1987 Water
Quality Act, the maximum daily civil penalty imposed for
municipal non-compliance was raised from $10,000 to $25,000 per
day as long as the violation persists.164 In accordance with the
Civil Penalty Policy,165 EPA is authorized to take a number of
159. The 235 consisted of 195 majors that were at some stage of the federal or
state judicial process (judicial order) and 40 majors that were at some phase of
the administrative process (administrative order).
160. The group of majors that was not on any schedule consisted of 150 majors
on judicial referrals, 28 on planned referrals and 10 classified as receiving other
referrals. The list contained majors that either had final schedules established but
had unresolved legal issues or that had violated previous schedules and did not
have final schedules in place.
161. Of the 1231 on enforceable schedules, 252 were at some stage of the
judicial process while 979 were at some phase of the administrative process.
162. Of the 441 minors, 259 were on judicial referrals while 182 were awaiting
action.
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
164. Id.
165. EPA, Civil Penalty Policy For Major Source Violators of the Clean Air and
Clean Water Act (Apr. 11, 1978). The policies are helpful in a number of ways
including suppressing arbitrary assessments of penalty amounts, making it easier
for agency officials to negotiate a penalty with a municipality and avoiding the
political pressure to reduce the penalty.
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factors into consideration before seeking the imposition of such a
penalty. The elements considered include the sum appropriate to
redress the harm/risk to public health or to the environment, the
amount appropriate to remove the benefit derived or to be gained
from delayed/avoided expenditure,' 66 the gravity of the violation,
the history of recalcitrance, the violators ability to pay and the
complication of procuring a penalty in litigation.
The court imposes civil penalties for a number of reasons,
including the deterence of future non-compliance and the
penalization of past misconduct. The remedy has been effective,
economical and fair. The penalties have produced some benefits
including the threat of bad publicity, deterrence, 167 fairness and
the provision of legal advice. The penalties 68 have had a
deterrent effect on non-compliant POTWs, partly because of the
bad publicity focussed on the violating POTWs. 169 In particular,
judicial remedies have attracted more bad publicity than
administrative penalties. With the threat of such attention,
communities are under immense pressure to comply. Hence, in
negotiating a settlement (for administrative penalties) with a
violating community, an agency may incur high costs, primarily
166. The economic benefits include delayed capital investment and saved
expenses. The policy specifically stipulates that economic benefits cannot be
recovered from delayed compliance or violations by municipalities. However,
to be able to impose more stringent civil penalties on municipalities, EPA is
currently investigating and calculating the profits, if any, made by municipalities
from noncompliance.
167. Being aware that officials of the Department of Natural Resources and
Justice in Wisconsin were willing and able to litigate, the communities made
more serious efforts to avoid violations. Marcia R. Gelpe, Pollution Control
Laws Against Public Facilities, 13 Harv. Envtl. Law Rev. 88 (1989). Stoddard
v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986).
Following the Court's decree, the plant was in compliance and was meeting its
pretreatment requirements.
168. Id. Both administrative and litigated.
169. R. Durant, When the Government Regulates Itself: EPA and Pollution
Control in the 1970s (1985).
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because some communities may vigorously attempt to avoid paying
such penalties. The costs incurred in administrative negotiations
are, however, not as large as those incurred in litigation.
Being less time consuming and less costly, administrative
penalties are usually more economical for agencies to impose than
judicial remedies.1 70  Besides, some state judges are sometimes
incapable of hearing water law cases involving highly complex and
technical issues.17 ' But with litigation, communities are assured
of legal counselling on exactly what the law requires.
Administrative penalties can satisfy the standard of
fairness 17  if similarly situated communities are required to pay
the same amount (according to their ability to pay). Litigation
alone, without the imposition of penalties, does not satisfy the
fairness goal but may sometimes be effective. 7 3 The imposition
170. Litigation is expensive and time consuming especially as the agency has
to seek consent from the office of the Attorney General. When the Deputy
Director, Water Division of EPA refers a case for litigation, it takes 17 reviews
and authorizations within EPA and the United States Department of Justice
before the case is filed in court. Hence, EPA prefers to issue a notice of
violation, an administrative order demanding compliance, or an extended
schedule for compliance. However, with administrative enforcement, some
POTWs delay compliance and escape judicial sanctions. Between 1977 and
1980, EPA issued 344 notices of violation. These notices constituted 21 percent
of all municipal enforcement actions. During the same period, the EPA issued
1261 administrative orders which constituted 75 percent of all municipal
enforcement action.
171. See generally W. Irwin, E. Selig, D. Hall, R. Lifoff, A. Millerand, Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, Institutional Enforcement (1975).
172. The imposition of the penalty can remove the competitive advantage a
community can derive from noncompliance. Henry F. Habicht, Justice
Department Has "Unfinished Business" in Superfund Enforcement Action,
Habicht Says, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 718 (June 26, 1987).
173. In some cases litigation, without the imposition of civil penalties has served
the purpose of gaining the local community's attention and putting pressure on
the public. For instance, in the United States v. City of Detroit, Judge Feikens
had such a strong, controlling personality, influence and presence in the court
room that most defendants paid tremendous attention to what he required.
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of penalties in a judicial action ensures that the community is
treated fairly vis-a-vis other complying and non-complying
communities. Penalties would not only make members of the
district aware of the violations but would also ensure that they (the
community) do not have an unfair advantage over other similarly
situated communities. For instance, a penalty can recoup from the
community costs it saved and benefits it gained from violation.
Benefits can be gained, if the local government uses the funds
allocated for the installation of waste water treatment facilities for
profit making public services which tend to attract more
industry.' 74
Observing that lack of judicial enforcement can result in an
increase in the level of municipal non-compliance, 75 some states,
particularly Wisconsin, have been willing and able to demand civil
penalties in litigation, (as opposed to administrative proceedings)
especially as Wisconsin has no formal administrative enforcement
machinery.176 Wisconsin is the only state in the United States
that seeks to impose civil penalties against POTWs in every case
litigated. 177
Despite the lack of imposition of penalties, the judge compelled compliance and
public attention. United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich.
1979). Marcia R. Gelpe, Pollution Control Laws Against Public Facilities, 13
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 88 (1989).
174. An example of such a use is the building of a shopping center in a local
community.
175. Reports confirm that lack of enforcement can act as a disincentive to
construction and to efficient operation of POTWs. Rep. On Construction Grants
Program, 1981, supra note 43, at 37.
176. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources normally refers a facility
to the Department of Justice for litigation. Marcia R. Gelpe, Pollution Control
Laws Against Public Facilities, 13 Harv. Envtl. Law Rev. 88 (1989).
177. Id. The penalties for consent orders and judicial decrees amount to about
$60,000, with an average of about $9,300.
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Reluctance, Failure or Inability to Impose; Biased Enforcement
Measures:
Generally, public and private 178 enforcement measures
against districts continue to be inadequate. Judges rarely impose
civil penalties 7 9 on non-complying POTWs.1
80
Besides, public enforcement agencies' 8' and private
citizens groups 82 have directed most enforcement efforts and
criticisms toward industrial point sources which account for less
178. The vast majority of private enforcement actions have been instituted by
environmental advocacy groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC). Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws Through
Citizen Suits: A Model, 60 Den. L.L. J. 553 (1983).
179. The court imposed $1000 on the POTW in the case of Stoddard v. Western
Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986). The court gave a number
of reasons for imposing a less stringent penalty including that the plant had
expeditiously addressed the problems and had made progress toward a resolution,
and that Western Carolina needed to undertake a huge capital improvement
program and a large fine would have constrained the ability of the city to comply
with federal and State regulations for construction of other or improved treatment
facilities. United States v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 25 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1921 (D.P.R. May 4, 1987). A civil penalty of $60,000 was
imposed on the noncomplying POTW in the case of State v. City of San
Francisco, 13 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1440 (Cal.Ct. of App. June 28, 1979).
The court imposed $30,100 on the POTW in the case of Galveston v. State, 518
S.W 2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
180. Instantaneous POTW compliance is often neither required nor received by
the court.
181. The EPA has enforced the CWA more rigorously and frequently against
industries than against municipalities. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Water Pollution Control Laws, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 10,426
(1984).
182. The right is given to all citizens. But those that are likely to have an
interest in enforcing the requirements of pollution control laws against POTWs
include public interest advocacy groups, downstream residents and stream users.
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than one-tenth of all water pollution. 8 3  For instance, between
1978 and 1984, six environmental advocacy groups 84 filed 162
cases against industries but failed to file a case against a
municipality during the same period.18 5  Additionally, between
1984 and April 1988, private groups filed more than six times as
many notices of intent to sue against industries as they (private
groups) did against government agencies. 8 6 With the threat of
negative publicity, profit oriented industries are more likely than
municipalities to be pressured to avoid a violation, 8 7 especially
183. There are economic incentives for private environmental advocacy groups,
in particular, to institute action against industries. In 1983, more than 90 percent
of penalties that industries paid in response to citizen suits under the CWA went
to environmental organizations and not to the United States treasury. Lewis,
Environmentalists' Authority to Sue Industry for Civil Penalties is
Unconstitutional Under Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,102
(1986). Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Public
Works and Transp., Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Concerning the Performance of the Municipal Wastewater Treatment
Construction Grants Program, H.R. No. 97-30, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1981).
EPA, Environmental Progress and Challenges: EPA's Update, 46, Fig W-1
(1988).
184. Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65
Tulane L. Rev. 339 (1990). The Atlantic States Legal Foundation; the
Connecticut Fund for Environment; Friends of the Earth; Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund; the Student Public Interest Group of New Jersey (SPIRG); the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The NRDC established a self-
sustaining enforcement program using attorneys' fees obtained from one case to
fund future cases.
185. Between 1982 and April 1984, environmental advocacy groups filed 162
of the 214 notices of intent to sue issued under the CWA. Environmental Law
Institute, Citizen Suits: An Analysis of Citizen Suit Enforcement Actions Under
EPA Administered Statutes 111-10, 27, 29 (1984).
186. Id.
187. Industries are more likely, able and willing to bring about immediate
positive change toward compliance than municipalities.
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as they (industries) rely heavily on ensuring the satisfaction of their
consumers.
88
Since municipalities have a higher rate of non-compliance
than industrial dischargers, the enforcement preference for
industrial dischargers does not stem solely from the urge to deter
and to punish polluters. In filing more cases against industries than
against municipalities, enforcers are primarily influenced by
economic considerations. 189 It is realistic to expect even the most
altruistic public attorney to pursue cases for the public benefit with
minimal costs and maximum rewards. 19°  The tendency of
government and private enforcers to target deep pockets is not
unique to enforcement actions brought under the CWA.
Government agencies have targeted primarily big pockets
(including those corporations that are potentially responsible
parties) for clean up of abandoned hazardous waste sites. Pursuant
to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability and
Compensation Act of 1980 (Superfund), 191 EPA was accorded the
authority to identify parties responsible for currently inactive or
abandoned waste sites and force private clean up actions.
Alternatively, EPA was required to clean up the sites itself and sue
the responsible parties later. Consequently, with the enormous
188. Profit oriented industries have a broad consumer base at the local, national
and international level. Hence, to protect the good image of the industry, such
firms are pressured to comply especially as they would not want to arouse any
negative publicity that would jeopardize business dealings with their consumers.
On the other hand, municipalities owe allegiance to their voters, particularly
those within their local districts.
189. Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 23, 53-70 (1985).
190. Unlike districts, private companies often have access to substantial funds
and possess high quality decision making capabilities. Additionally, industries
are more liable to undertake less complicated settlement negotiations. Thus, an
enforcer is likely to obtain higher settlements from an industry than from a
financially incapacitated, bureaucratic municipality.
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988).
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economic incentive, government and private enforcers have
invested tremendous time, effort and human resources, in an
attempt to identify, track down, and sue responsible parties,
particularly large wealthy corporations. A senior attorney working
with the State EPA equivalent in San Francisco, California,
confirmed that about three-quarters of the legal practice of the
agency is devoted to Superfund cases.
Further, when courts impose penalties on municipal entities,
fines are often less harsh than those levied on industrial
dischargers.1
92
There are several reasons for disparity between the
enforcement measures brought against cities and those filed against
industries. These include political 93 and practical considerations,
192. Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority, 784 F.2d 1200
(4th Cir. 1986). Supra note 178.
193. The reluctance of federal agencies to sue cities stems partly from the
reality that by suing districts, the Federal Government is indirectly suing itself
especially as the municipalities are a lower branch of Government. Local
political pressures have influenced some judges in their decisions not to impose
stringent civil penalties. Marcia R. Gelpe, Pollution Control Laws Against
Public Facilities, 13 Harv. Envtl. Law Rev. 88 (1989). Some factors including
the power struggle, unaccountability, bad communication and lack of
coordination between utility agencies and regulatory institutions have resulted
partly in a number of problems. The difficulties include conflict, inconsistencies
and delays in the advice conveyed to POTWs; failure of municipalities to apply
for extensions of compliance deadlines as well as delays by enforcement agencies
in initiating enforcement action against non compliant POTWs. While arguing
over responsibility and authority, violations continue unabated. For instance, in
Detroit, a division among the city council, the city sewage department, the
mayor, and others contributed to violations. United States v. City of Detroit, 476
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Disagreements between a State sewage
authority and its constituent counties led to prolonged litigation and long term
violations in Maryland. United States v. District of Colombia, 654 F.2d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1981). The case of Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S.
34 (1985), illustrated that cities and towns have struggled over regionalization.
For instance, while permitting individual landowners to connect to its (city's)
facility if the area was annexed to the district, the city refused to allow towns to
connect to its treatment plant. In the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Envtl. Strike Force v. City of Jeannette, 9 Pa.Cmwlth. 306, 305 A.2d 774 (1973),
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as well as"94 the misconception 95 that municipalities, unlike
industries, do not profit from non-compliance.196  In addition,
there is a perceived variation between industries and municipalities
regarding the ability to efficiently operate and maintain wastewater
treatment facilities.197 Finally, the profits earned by municipal
entities are difficult to calculate. This raises a concern that
communities failing to comply as a result of financial difficulties
will suffer more hardship. Because POTWs are perceived as non-
the State attempted to obtain a court order that the city must join the regional
sewer authority.
194. Supra note 178.
195. Because of the general assumption that districts do not profit from
noncompliance, fines levied against POTWs do not reflect economic benefits
gained. Instead, the penalties are based on the city's ability to pay. Officials
consider a number of factors including the size and resources of the municipality.
I am more inclined to believe that there are instances when municipalities can
benefit from violating the CWA provisions. For instance, profits would be
gained if the local governments used the funds allocated for the installation of
wastewater facilities for the promotion of other profit making services such as
the building of a shopping center. Besides, to gain economic benefits,
municipalities could attract industries to invest in their district and to connect to
their POTW facilities (through the pretreatment program) by failing to impose
stringent enforcement measures against industrial violators of the pretreatment
program. There is, therefore, a pressing need for environmental enforcement
agencies to conduct intensive economic surveys and studies of municipalities,
particularly those that have received financial assistance but have still failed to
comply with the provisions of the CWA. The economic study of such
noncomplying districts should focus on a number of issues including the
following: The level of priority accorded wastewater treatment projects and
profits derived from diverting allocated funds to other more lucrative projects.
196. One justification for imposing tougher enforcement on industries, rather
than on municipalities, is that the former profit from polluting behavior.
197. Industries are technically and financially capable of efficiently operating
and maintaining facilities. Fund shortages impair a district's ability to attract the
qualified staff necessary to do the same.
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profit public facilities 198 providing public services, there is the
view that imposing fines on POTWs runs counter to EPA's policy
of imposing penalties to make pollution unprofitable. Fines have
proven ineffective in compelling POTW compliance, especially
when the reason for non-compliance was lack of funds. Judges are
concerned that civil penalties come from a restricted quantity of
public funds which could otherwise be used by municipalities for
compliance. 99 Hence, imposing such penalties could detract
from compliance." °  Additionally, because all districts do not
receive federal funds, judges are concerned with the fairness of
punishing unfunded communities for non-compliance.'Ol Some
courts advocate minimal fines on POTWs because they believe that
taxpayers are likely to bear the burden rather than responsible
public officials.
202
198. POTW are presumed to be non-profit, particularly for tax purposes.
199. United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 611 (D.R.I. 1980).
The judge in this case refused to assess immediate fines for civil contempt
because such a remedy would reduce the resources available for compliance and
penalize tax payers who are not responsible, supra note 178. To avoid financial
hardship on the POTWs, the judge imposed less stringent penalties in the case
of Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.
1986).
200. Id. Fines jeopardize attempts to achieve municipal compliance by diverting
limited funds from local waste water treatment programs.
201. Environment Reporter Current Developments, "Sewage Treatment:
Officials say EPA will seek penalties from MDC for past pollution of Boston
Harbor," 17 E.R. 2127 (Apr. 17, 1987). James Hoyte, Massachusetts Secretary
of Environmental Affairs, Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, expressed
the view that requiring authorities to spend money to correct violations makes
more sense and is more practical than the imposition of civil penalties.
202. Supra note 196. United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602,
611 (D.R.I. 1980). Court Created Receivership Emerging For the Persistent
Noncompliance With Environmental Laws, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,059, 10062
(1980).
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Public v. Private Enforcement Measures;
The Ineffective Discharge Monitoring System:
Since, unlike public agencies, private citizens are not
constrained by political and budgetary2°3 considerations, private
enforcers, particularly six environmental groups204 have filed
more cases than those brought by public enforcement agencies.
Private actions instituted through nationally and regionally
organized environmental organizations continue to account for
roughly two-thirds of all enforcement actions under the CWA.20 5
More than half of all notices of intent to sue were instituted by
only five environmental organizations. °6 The increase in cases
and notices filed by citizen groups was enhanced by the
aforementioned regulatory system set up under the CWA by
1982.207 Access to information is a key element in
environmental citizen participation. The DMR system208
203. Landes and Posner believe that the prevention of over enforcement is one
end result of budget constraints. Landes and Posner, Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. Legal Studies 1, 36-37 (1975).
204. For the six environmental advocacy groups, supra note 183.
205. Supra note 183.
206. Supra note 182, 183. Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of
Environmental Law, 65 Tulane L. Rev. 339, 13 (1990). The Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund, The Atlantic States Legal Defense Foundation, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Friends of the Earth (FOE), Public Interest
Research Group (PIRG). Notices of intent to sue filed by environmental groups
have not always led to litigation but have resulted in either settlements or consent
decrees.
207. Supra text accompanying notes 141-50.
208. Supra note 150. In order to determine the degree of effective compliance,
it is necessary to scrutinize the discharges of polluters and to compare them with
the terms of their permits and effluent limitations.
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facilitated and simplified the process of detecting and identifying
violations.2 9
But some of the reports presented may be inaccurate (the
extent of non-compliance may be greater than indicated), especially
since some dischargers may have the incentive to understate actual
discharges. Another problem is that violators sometimes evade
reporting requirements altogether. Because of a shortage of staff,
enforcement agencies are financially and technically incapable of
conducting on-site visits to inspect the treatment plants and to
determine the accuracy of the reports. To deal effectively with the
monitoring problem, Congress should enact a statute requiring
municipalities and industries to bear the inspection costs. The
statute should provide some economic incentives for violators to
submit reports. Some incentive mechanisms that could be
introduced include reducing the penalties of those violators that
submit reports voluntarily and religiously, and imposing more
stringent penalties on those that try to escape submitting reports.
Besides the DMR system, the toxic release inventory, (TRI)
mandated under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to
Know Act,210 requires industries to submit reports on the quantity
of 320 specific wastes they release. As of 1990, about 22,569
plants had submitted reports (United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Toxics in the Community 1, 1991). EPA
provides the TRI information from their database, thereby giving
the community organizations information on which to base their
legal actions.
The constitutional system of separated and limited power is
partly responsible for the active citizen participation in the
enforcement against violators of environmental statutes. The Tenth
Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Limiting
209. The NPDES permit violations are easily detected by any interested person
including the layman. The Discharge Monitoring Reports filed with the regional
EPA offices are made readily available to any interested person upon request.
210. Section 313 of the EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988).
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governmental powers (federal, state and local) enhances freedom
of private decision making.
Legislative and Judicial Response; Weak System of Checks and
Balances; Ineffective Means of Safeguarding Against Abuse;
Ineffectual Means of Coordination:
While the legislature has successfully attempted to sway the
frequency and the nature of public enforcement by controlling
resources and setting penalties, Congress has had difficulty
balancing private and public enforcement through economic
incentives and fines.2 ' The following example provides an
illustration. To ensure extensive enforcement by public agencies,
the legislature could set penalties below the social cost of any
given offense and increase the quantity of public resources
available for enforcement. Relatively low penalties compel
extensive government enforcement due to a lack of monetary
deterrance.212 Accordingly, if the legislature increases the penalty
imposed, a public enforcer would reduce his investment in tracking
down and prosecuting offenders primarily because of the realistic
presumption that increased deterrence (resulting from higher fines)
would reduce the frequency of the offense.213 In contrast, the
211. Unlike government enforcement agencies, private agencies do not rely on
Congress for resources. In an effort to maintain extensive and abatement-
oriented private enforcement, the courts adopted the view that the citizen suit
provisions of the Clean Water Act do not confer jurisdiction over citizen suits
for "past violations that have ceased" but accords jurisdiction if the plaintiffs
make a good faith allegation of "continuous or intermittent violation." Scott, B.
Garrison, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Standing, and Citizen Suits: The Effect of
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 48 MD. L. Rev.
403, 420 (1989). Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484
U.S. 49 (1987).
212. For instance, parking violations, which attract low penalties, are policed by
meter maids.
213. Therefore, to conserve the public resources used for the detection and
apprehension of culprits, the legislature has often set penalties at a level above
the social cost of any given offense.
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prospect of monetary losses would prompt private enforcers to
increase enforcement efforts.
The traditional enforcement model gave government
institutions the primary responsibility of enforcing environmental
laws for the public good and apparently assumed that private
enforcement would be ineffective. However, in the 1970s,
environmentalists, in particular, criticized the executive branch for
the low priority given to environmental concerns. Due in part to
pressure from environmentalists and to the problem of under
enforcement by public agencies, Congress introduced the private
citizen suit provision as a supplement2e1 4 to public enforcement.
To propel federal and state agencies to higher levels of
environmental performance, Congress (predominantly Democrats)
took actions which included restricting executive branch discretion,
transferring key management decisions from state to federal
government, expanding citizen and press information rights and
encouraging active public participation in order to monitor agency
implementation of the Clean Water Act.
The Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe215 extended the scope of reviewability of
agency acts to include informal actions. By compelling the
defendant agency to set up a record permitting review, the Court
enhanced the participation of citizen groups in the review process.
The Supreme Court (comprising the conservative majority)
has sometimes acted contrary to legislative intent and has altered
the administration of environmental laws by according agencies a
broader discretion in implementing such laws. In Chevron U.S.A.,
214. Citizen suits are meant to supplement EPA enforcement. Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). Supra note 148
and 209. Citizen suits were introduced as a type of extended private nuisance
action.
215. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The guidelines for review of agency rules and
regulations are stipulated in the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-
559 (1988).
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Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,216 the Supreme
Court held that when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to a specific issue, the courts should defer to the agency's
interpretation of the statute. The Court unanimously upheld the
EPA's administration of the pollution trading permit program
within a regional bubble because the Clean Air Act was silent on
the subject. Though this case involved the Clean Air Act, it is still
relevant in illustrating the broad discretion that can, sometimes, be
accorded to environmental agencies by some courts. Some
agencies have relied on the Chevron Case to undermine legislative
intent to circumscribe agency discretion and coerce executive
action in accordance with the demands of the legislature.
To limit the scope of the executive branch, Congress
allowed citizens to play a significant role as "private attorney
generals" in assisting the legislative branch in the process of
agency oversight. The courts have generally favored citizen
participation and private suits, but in Lugan v. National Wildlife
Federation, the Supreme Court limited citizen participation in
agency proceedings.217
Citizen suits have been effective, to a certain extent, in
goading administrative agencies into efficiently performing their
enforcement functions to a degree. However, without effective
means to safeguard against the abuse of the private citizen suit
provision, there exists a danger of private over-enforcement which
includes the filing of frivolous suits. 21 8 The attempts of Congress
216. 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
217. 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
218. Supra note 148. The CWA provides that no action may be instituted by
private citizens if the Administrator or State has commenced or is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in court of the United States. Additionally,
no private action may be instituted unless the government is given 60 days
advance notice. Section 505(d) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988). To
prevent private over enforcement and to ensure that private enforcers are altruists
and not bounty hunters, legislators prohibited the derivation of rewards under the
CWA and required that citizens who protect the public should only be
reimbursed attorneys fees and litigation costs. Altruism is intended to function
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to address this issue have been unsuccessful. This is partially due
to judicial decisions which afford private enforcers the opportunity
to solicit transfer payments in the form of above-cost attorneys'
fees and credit projects from alleged polluters. 19  These
decisions undermine the legislative intent to prevent over-
enforcement and to ensure that citizen plaintiffs have mainly
altruistic motives in filing suits. Instead of paying the United
States Treasury civil fimes as required by federal law,220 the
monies are converted into tax deductible credit programs. Huge
as a proxy for efficient incentives. Private citizens are meant to be motivated
purely by benefits of redressing environmental harm and not by personal benefits
of compensation. CWA § 505(d), 33 USC § 1365 (d) (1988). Miller, Private
Enforcement of Federal Water Pollution Control Laws, Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
10,309, 10,407-16 (1983). Besides, federal law required that civil penalties
recovered from a law suit be deposited in the United States Treasury. Section
505(a) of the CWA, 33 USC § 1365 (a) (1988). Unlike the CWA, the Resources
Conservation and Recovery Act allows private citizens to derive rewards or
damages from action instituted. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988).
219. Instead of paying civil penalties, the court has sometimes imposed a
requirement that noncomplying treatment plants pay into an environmental
project fund. Environmental advocacy groups can solicit transfer payments from
alleged polluters. Rewards are gained through the payment of attorneys fees and
through the conversion of settlements to credit projects. Payments for such
projects after a private settlement often go to environmental groups other than
the organization bringing the enforcement action. The funds are administered by
the plaintiff or third party and are for environmental improvements. EPFs have
been granted in a number of consent orders. For instance in the case of State v.
Storm Lake, $3,000 was to be used for a conservation or fisheries project
receiving waters. State v. Storm Lake, No. 21 474 (Iowa Vista County Ct.
March 22, 1982). $100,000 was allocated for an environmentally beneficial
project in the case of United States v. Niagara Falls, No. 81-363c (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 19, 1984). $750,000 was set aside for environmentally beneficial programs
that furthered the objectives of the CWA in the case of United States v. Board
of Comm'rs of Hamilton County, No. C-1-85-0693 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 1986).
The legislature has not yet enacted any statutes concerning credit projects.
220. Supra note 218.
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settlements22' accrue to private enforcers, particularly
environmental advocacy groups, thereby providing an economic
incentive 222 to overzealously file such suits. This arrangement is
popular because alleged violators find it economically attractive to
settle out of court with private environmental advocacy groups
rather than deal with public enforcement agencies and/or pay
litigated remedies.223 Concern with this practice prompted public
officials, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), to argue both
publicly and before hearings that the frequent substitution of credit
221. Settlements contain four elements including a fine payable to the general
treasury, payment of attorneys' fees and litigation costs to the plaintiffs or their
advocate; provisions for achieving compliance with NPDES permit limits which
often specify the installation of additional pollution control technology and
periodic submission of DMRs to the citizen plaintiff; mitigation or credit
programs to be instituted or paid for by the alleged violator in addition to fines
or in lieu of a portion of fines.
222. Supra note 219. The court held that the market rate at which public
advocacy groups are to be paid is the average rate charged for similar work
conducted by profit oriented attorneys in the community. Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A survey of 29 cases in the
period between 1983 and May 1985, revealed that more than 65 percent of the
settlements, having a combined settlement amount of slightly less than
$1,000,000 went to environmental organizations. The remaining was split
between the treasury (about 22 percent) and the State and Local agencies (20
percent). Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement,
34 Buffalo L. Rev. 833 (1985). NRDC set up the Open Space Institute as a
repository for case settlements in CWA suits.
223. Id. Litigation is very expensive and time consuming for the alleged
violator and the enforcer. Besides, paying monies into the treasury constitutes
a 100 percent tax on the private enforcers recovery. In contrast to penalties paid
into the treasury, payments for credit projects are often tax deductible. Alleged
violators can negotiate a heavy discount to the fines paid into credit projects.
Joseph F. Guida, Dramatic Growth in Citizen Suits Under the Federal Clean
Water Act, Nat'l. L. J. 24 (Dec 3, 1984).
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programs created a potential for abuse of the citizen suit
22provision. " In response, Congress authorized the DOJ to review
and monitor private settlements within 45 days and to ensure that
a portion of the assessed penalties go to the federal treasury. 25
However, the 45 day period is hardly enough time for the public
enforcement agency to scrutinize settlements especially since the
agency is often swamped with more work than it can handle.
A further problem is that the executive branch does not
have full discretion to terminate private enforcement and cannot
unilaterally withhold, void or adjust private settlements due to the
power of the judiciary. To thwart the continuation of a private
suit, the only option open to the government enforcement agency
is to initiate its own proceedings. Hence, there is the danger that
public enforcement agencies may be pushed into filing enforcement
actions that are frivolous and counterproductive.2 6 Despite the
objections of the DOJ, courts have sometimes entered a settlement
providing for payments to organizations other than the United
States Treasury. In Natural Resources Defense Council v.
224. Raymond Ludwiezewski, Associate Deputy Attorney Gen. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Environmental Credit Projects Under the Clean Water Act: Hearings on
H.R 3411 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment and the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 1st Sess 21-22 (1987).
225. The proposed private settlements must be submitted to the DOJ, which may
provide comments within forty five days. The new provision of the CWA is
called the "protection of interests of the United States." Section 505 of the CWA
was amended by adding a new paragraph (c)(3), which provides that "no consent
judgement shall be entered in an action in which the Unites States is not a party
prior to 45 days following the receipt of a copy of the proposed consent
judgement by the Attorney General and the Administrator." 33 U.S.C. §
1365(c)(3) (1988).
226. There may also be the danger of a civil equivalent of double jeopardy.
Though some environmental law experts believe that the possibility of double
jeopardy is fairly remote. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution
Control Laws, Part III, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,427 (1984).
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Interstate Paper Corp,227 the court held, inter alia, that even if
the proposed payment does not conform to the requirements of
EPA policy guidelines, it can still be properly agreed upon by the
parties to the action.228
Credit Projects and Potential for Abuse; Pros and Cons;
Credit Projects v. Civil Penalties:
Unlike penalties paid into the United States Treasury, credit
projects are used directly for eliminating the violation and for
improving the environment. Payments into project funds may be
easier and more economical to negotiate since defendants are likely
to cooperate. The alleged violator can avoid the negative publicity
that stems from a civil penalty and can earn the good reputation of
doing something positive to improve the environment. However,
credit projects should not completely displace civil penalties.
229
Without the threat of bad publicity, the non-compliant POTW does
not face as much pressure to comply with regulations as would a
facility that was required to pay a civil penalty. The indirect
benefits that private enforcers derive from credit programs may, in
part, result in the filing of suits. Therefore, Congress should enact
legislation requiring private enforcers to pay fines incurred into
environmental funds and to set up credit projects. The monies
should be used solely for remediation of environmental harm.30
To deal with the possibility of private enforcers abusing the right
to implement credit programs, the projects should not be tax
deductible.
227. 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1135, 1136 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
228. Regardless of the disapproval of the DOJ, courts have signed consent
decrees.
229. The nature of the remedy awarded should be determined on a case by case
basis.
230. Supra note 223. To date, only judicial decisions support the
implementation of credit projects. The legislature has not yet enacted any laws
with regard to credit projects.
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Other Remedies;231 Pros and Cons; Failure, Reluctance to
Impose; Disparity Between Enforcement Measures:
The legislature amended the CWA to impose criminal
penalties of up to two years in prison and fines of up to $50,000
per day for those who negligently violate the Act 32. Criminal
sanctions have been used against public officials in very few
cases.2 33 A penalty under the Act is a form of strict liability and
neither fault nor intent are relevant except in connection with the
amount of the penalty. 34
Despite the legal complexity of prosecuting officers of
private corporations, criminal sanctions have been regularly
imposed against such officers235 to deter non-compliance with
231. Remedies include criminal sanctions, sewer moratorium, and receivership.
232. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988).
233. For example, United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Hoflin, No. CR85-82T (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 1986); United States
v. Mcintyre, Env't Rep. (BNA) 1299 (Sept. 4, 1987). In United States v.
Brittain, the court upheld the conviction of the sewage treatment facility
supervisor for the City of Enid, Oklahoma for negligently and wilfully causing
the discharge of untreated wastes into navigable waters. The officer had general
and supervisory authority over the operation of the district's wastewater treatment
facility. Evidence demonstrated that the supervisor had been informed that
pollutants were being discharged. The supervisor had observed the discharge
violations on two occasions, but instructed his subordinate not to report the
violations to EPA, as the city's permit required.
234. United States v. Texas Pipeline Co., 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979).
235. Corporate officials have received fines and jail sentences. For example,
Wisconsin v. Doyle Handymark Corp., No. 86-CF-53 (Wis. Juneau County Cir.
Ct. 1986), 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 832 (Oct. 3, 1986). Wrenn, Important New
Trends in the Prosecution of Environmental Crimes, 1 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
1025 (Feb. 18, 1987); Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws Seeks
Deterrence Amid Need for Increased Coordination, Training, Public Awareness
(Special Analysis), 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 800 (Sept. 26, 1986).
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environmental statutes.236 To hold a corporate officer liable for
illegal hazardous waste related activities, the court considers a
number of issues, including the personal participation of the officer
in the illegal act and whether or not the corporate veil should be
pierced. There is some controversy as to whether or not it is
necessary to pierce the corporate veil to hold liable an officer who
has participated in illegal hazardous waste related activities. The
law regards the corporation as a legal entity "separate and apart"
from its shareholders, officers and directors. Under the traditional
corporate law of limited liability, officers are immune from liability
for the unlawful actions of the corporation, unless the officer
personally participated in the illegal acts or unless other grounds
existed for disregarding the corporation as a separate legal entity
(the equitable principle of piercing the veil).237 Some legal
scholars have asserted that it is not necessary to pierce the veil to
hold an officer, who participated in an unlawful activity, liable.238
Piercing the veil is a means used by the courts, primarily to hold
liable the owners or shareholders of a corporation. Shareholders of
corporations are immune from liability for actions of the company
unless the circumstances warrant the piercing of the corporate veil.
Liability of shareholders is limited to their contribution of capital.
The court considers a number of factors in determining whether the
corporate veil should be lifted to hold the shareholder liable. The
elements considered include whether the corporation was formed
or used for an illegal, fraudulent or unjust purpose. In the case of
236. For example, the Los Angeles Toxic Waste Strike Force convicted the
president of Culligan Water Company's Hollywood plant for the corporation's
discharge of large amounts of hexavalent chromium into municipal sewers. The
officer was sentenced to three months in custody and the company was fined
$10,000. Steven Zipperman, The Park Doctrine - Application of Strict Criminal
Liability To Corporate Individuals For Violation Of Environmental Crimes, 10
UCLA J. Envtl. L. and Pol'y 123 (1991). DiMento, Environmental Law and
American Business: Dilemmas of Compliance 43 (1986).
237. See U.S. v. Mahler, 20 Env't. Rep. Caf. (BNA) 1738 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
238. See W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 1137
(rev. perm. ed. 1986).
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Ramsey v. Adams, 39 the court listed a number of factors that
would support the piercing of the corporate veil. The factors
include undercapitalization of a one-man corporation, failure to
observe corporate formalities, use of the corporation as a facade for
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders and the use
of the corporate entity in promoting injustice and fraud.
The possibility of criminal prosecution and the threat of
negative publicity put pressure on private companies to comply.
Unlike corporate officers, public officials are normally immune
from criminal actions brought by water quality enforcement
agencies because political considerations militate against jailing
public employees. Moreover, if sanctions were regularly imposed
on municipalities, competent persons might be dissuaded from
entering public service. While the public sector cannot afford to
offset the risk of criminal liability for public civil servants, private
companies can offer higher remunerations and better conditions of
employment to attract qualified individuals in spite of the increased
risk of criminal liability.
Considering the severity of the penalties imposed, the law
gives more protection to defendants in criminal proceedings than
in civil proceedings. Accordingly, criminal sanctions are more
difficult 4 o and more expensive to impose than civil penalties.
Sewer moratoria24O ' have been imposed by officials in
agencies and by some courts.242  Courts have imposed sewer
239. 4 Kan. App. 2d 184, 604 P.2d 1025 (1979).
240. Criminal penalties appear more harsh than civil penalties.
241. Section 402(h) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1988). A sewer
moratorium is a prohibition against hooking new sewers to a treatment system
or hooking new facilities to existing sewers. Because injunctive relief is
impractical, EPA rarely enjoins POTWs that are out of compliance with effluent
limitations set forth in their NPDES permits.
242. United States v. Douglas County, 5 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1977 (D.Nev
May 16, 1973).
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moratoria in only a few cases. 43  In United States v.
Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission,244 the court
ordered a moratorium on new sewer connections. Judge David A.
Mazzone observed that an entity that falls behind schedule in
eliminating pollution should not be allowed, simultaneously, to
increase pollution through additional sewer connections. Following
such an observation, the judge ordered a moratorium on new sewer
connections throughout the Massachusetts Metropolitan District.
Moratoria have been used more frequently in other cases
not involving violations of water laws. For instance, in New York
State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey,245 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit demonstrated that
shutting down a non-compliant state institution would be preferable
to dictating to the community the means of spending their funds.
Practical considerations militate against the regular
imposition of sewer bans on municipalities. Unlike private
corporations, cities do not have alternate facilities to replace
POTWs.246 Closing down a major treatment plant or imposing
a moratorium on future sewer connections247 would threaten the
community's health and welfare. It is impractical to attempt to
keep people from flushing their lavatories. Moreover, the remedy
243. The cases include United States v. Douglas County, 5 Env't Rep. Cas
(BNA) 1577 (D. Nev. May 16, 1973); Lakeland Property Owners v. Township
of Northfield, 3 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1893 (Mich. County Cir. Ct. Feb. 29,
1972); United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n., 757 F. Supp. 121, 130 (D.
Mass 1991). Moratoria was also applied in consent decrees.
244. 757 F.Supp. 121, 130 (D. Mass. 1991).
245. 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980).
246. St Paul's Metropolitan Sewage Treatment Plant handles the demands of
nearly 1.5 million Minneapolis-St. Paul residents. This constitutes about 80
percent of the metropolitan area. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency News
Release, Oct. 28, 1981.
247. Supra note 234. Section 402(h) of the CWA allows a moratorium on
sewer hookups when the municipality fails to comply with effluent limitations.
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of a moratorium has an adverse economic impact on the district,
particularly where industries might be trying to invest in the
district. The relief is unfair to developers and commercial
establishments that have planned or partly completed the
installation of sewage treatment plants.
However, studies confirm that sewer moratoria can be
effective in gaining the attention of the community and in ensuring
compliance with the CWA. 4 s  Since neither high technical
expertise nor excessive financial resources are required to turn off
a facility, a sewer moratorium is economical and easy to impose in
a state whether or not it has a preexisting permit system for
hookups. To ensure greater fairness and effectiveness, prior notice
of the imposition of a moratorium should be given to the non-
complying community. Such notice would reduce resistance and
encourage the community to improve the conditions of the sewage
treatment facility as soon as possible.
Receivers 4 9 have been used in very few environmental
cases.2 11 Receivership was used in United States v. City of
248. A former official of the Decatur, Illinois Sewer Authority Board confirmed
that one community which had a history of persistent violations reacted
positively to a threat to impose a prohibition on new sewers. The threat created
an incentive for all the members of the public to attempt to resolve their
problems. In this case, a sewer ban was more effective than a civil penalty of
$25,000 in getting the attention of the community. Marcia R Gelpe, Pollution
Control Laws Against Public Facilities, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 116 (1989).
249. When the operators of a treatment facility are unwilling to comply, courts
can resort to the appointment of a receiver who will comply with the court order
and supervise the plant. A receiver is appointed by the court to run a facility in
compliance with the court's order. The receiver is normally entrusted with a
wide range of authority, including the power to borrow monies, hire consultants
and manage all operations of the plant under its control.
250. United States v. Detroit, 476 F.Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979). A court
appointed the mayor of the city as receiver to avoid compliance problems that
stemmed primarily from conflicts among the facility's operators. The mayor was
authorized to directly supervise the facility rather than be answerable to the
Water Board, the Civil Service Commission, the City Council or the State.
Detroit,"' where the defendant POTW consistently failed to
adhere to NPDES permit requirements and judicial enforcement
orders. Instead of pursuing conventional sanctions, the court
placed the facility under the direct control of a receiver who was
given full authority to operate the facility until compliance was
achieved.252 Receivers have been elected more frequently in
cases involving enforcement of other types of laws against public
institutions, including school desegregation25 3 and prison disputes.
Receivership offers unique advantages in its adaptability to
municipal offenders and in its coercive impact. Unlike sewer
moratoria and monetary relief, receivership does not jeopardize
community interests. Municipalities that previously viewed
themselves as immune from enforcement proceedings are put on
notice that effective municipal enforcement mechanisms exist and
will be utilized where other remedies are ineffective.
However, since the plant will ultimately be returned to the
city, it may be more practical and sustainable to ensure compliance
and efficient operation and maintenance by employees of the plant.
Hence, instead of appointing a receiver to operate the facility, an
official from within the establishment can be appointed to ensure
effective compliance with the court order. Alternatively, an
administrator2 54 can be elected to supervise municipal compliance
with the court's order. An administrator can put pressure on the
251. 476 F.Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
252. Supra note 250. The court quoted the principle laid down in the Morgan
Case that "where the more usual remedies (contempt proceedings and
injunctions) are not promising as they invite confrontation and delay; and when
the usual remedies are inadequate, a court of equity is justified, particularly in
aid of an outstanding injunction, in turning to less common ones, such as
receivership, to get the job done."
253. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976). The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the appointment of a receiver
to oversee all aspects of the desegregation of the Boston School District.
254. Administrator varies from a receiver in that the former normally does not
have the authority to operate the facility directly.
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state to assist the municipality. The primary problem with electing
an administrator may be lack of funds to pay his salary.255 But,
the salary can be justified if his appointment results in increased
compliance and circumvents the need to resolve the dispute through
more costly litigation.
Summary of Main Points:
The pitfalls in the enforcement model include: the failure,
reluctance and inability of the judiciary to impose stringent
penalties on POTWs; the failure of environmental agencies to
institute rigorous enforcement measures against non-compliant
POTWs;25 6 the weak safeguards against abuse of enforcement
provisions; the ineffective mechanisms of coordination between
public and private enforcement agencies; the disparity between the
nature and the frequency of enforcement actions brought against
industries and those against POTWs; the ineffective system of
monitoring discharge and detecting violators and the difficulty of
striking a balance between the various branches of government
involved in enforcement. The disparity emanates primarily from
a number of factors including: political, economic and practical
considerations; the general misconception that POTWs do not make
a profit and would be excessively hard hit by such penalties and
the perceived variation between industries and POTWs in the
method of financing, providing and investing in waste water
treatment facilities. The shortcomings in the public enforcement
model do not stem primarily from the unavailability of
remedies,257  but from budgetary, institutional, 8  and
255. The salary can be reduced if the administrator works part time.
256. Under enforcement of water pollution laws by government agencies is not
primarily due to a lack of legal authority, but essentially to the failure and/or
inability of relevant authorities to use their full powers against POTWs.
257. The aforementioned remedies exist to deal effectively with violations, on
a case by case basis.
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bureaucratic constraints, as well as impediments to the full use or
application of remedies by relevant public enforcement agencies.
Rigid public enforcement efforts (or threats of such action)
have induced compliance among some municipalities. However,
enforcement measures do not always result in POTW compliance,
particularly in cases involving financially strapped districts. In
enforcing the requirements of the CWA, the judiciary applies a
strict liability rule and not a strict remedy principle.25 9
SECTION FOUR
CONCLUSION
Political, social and economic considerations have bedeviled
the whole process of financing POTWs and of instituting
enforcement action against non-compliant treatment facilities under
the CWA. Despite such considerations, the judiciary and the
legislature have still played an unpredictable role in shaping the
enforcement model and in molding the mode of financing such
facilities.
The deficiencies in the method of financing and investing
in publicly owned treatment works stem primarily from the
aforementioned pitfalls in the implementation of former Title I1260
and current Title IV261 of the CWA. A major pitfall of the
system of financing and investing has been the lack of a significant
role by market approaches in the development of publicly owned
258. The deficiency in the enforcement model stems primarily from problems
with the institutional mechanisms of enforcement.
259. The court does not always impose a remedy on a POTW that has been
found to have violated the Act. Instantaneous municipal compliance is not
always possible.
260. See section two.
261. See section two.
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treatment plants. Given the non-excludable characteristic of the
provision of waste water treatment services, some financially
capable households have had an incentive not to pay for user fees,
not to declare their willingness to pay, and to attempt to free ride.
Partly because of the inability to ensure that only those that have
paid for the services obtain the benefits, the private sector lacks the
incentive to invest in the provision of such services.
Small financially depressed districts in particular were the
major victims of the deficiencies in the modes of financing and
investing in publicly owned treatment works. Additionally, such
small districts violated the Act and were not deterred from non-
compliance by the finding that financially deprived POTWs are not
exempt from the provisions.262
On the face of it, lack of access to federal funds and to state
loans contributed to the financial inability of municipalities to
afford to comply with the CWA. But a closer look at the situation
reveals that the availability of a high proportion of federal grants
in relation to local funds has sometimes had a negative impact on
the compliance of some POTWs, in part, because of the
disincentive to efficiently invest in cost effective facilities and to
effectively maintain and operate such plants.
Strict government enforcement efforts (or the threat of such
measures), particularly against larger non-complying districts, have
led to small increases in municipal compliance. However, small
financially strapped communities have not reacted positively to
such enforcement measures.
Deficiencies in the enforcement model include: the failure,
reluctance or inability of the relevant enforcement agencies to seek
remedies and/or institute rigorous enforcement measures,
particularly against public facilities; the reluctance or failure of
courts to fully apply the remedies; weak safeguards against abuse
of the right of enforcement;2 63 ineffective coordination of public
262. See section two.
263. The enforcement model tends to suffer from over-enforcement by private
enforcers and from under-enforcement by public environmental enforcement
institutions.
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and private enforcement agencies; biased enforcement
measures;264 the ineffective system of monitoring discharge and
of detecting violators and the difficulty of striking a balance
between the various arms of government. The disparity between
enforcement measures brought against industiial dischargers and
those actions instituted against POTWs has stemmed primarily
from some factors including: political, economic and practical
considerations; the general misconception that POTWs do not make
a profit from non-compliance and the perceived variation between
industries and POTWs in modes of financing and investing in
waste water treatment facilities.
Moreover, the judiciary applies a strict liability rule and not
a strict remedy doctrine.265 Instantaneous POTW compliance has
not always been possible and practical.
Considering the deficiencies in the mode of financing and
investing, I propose the following: the introduction of increased
flexibility into the system including an increased role by market
approaches in the development of publicly owned treatment works;
the relaxation of restrictive state laws on financing mechanisms; the
provision of incentives for private participation and more judicial
control over state legislation curbing financing for environmental
26projects.
The EPA should consider seeking legislative changes to
Title IV of the Clean Water Act, including the establishment of a
new fund exclusively for small community waste water treatment
and management. The legislative amendments should include the
extension of the SRF loan term beyond 20 years to enable small
264. Disparity between the measures brought against industrial dischargers and
those actions instituted against POTWs. See section three.
265. There has been a failure to use the available remedies. There are remedies
available which satisfy the test of economy, fairness and effectiveness. The
remedies should be fully applied. However, the nature of the relief imposed
should be determined on a case by case basis.
266. See section two. Judicial Abrogation of State Restrictions on Financing
Mechanisms.
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districts to repay their loans. Additionally, states should be
encouraged to vary interest rates, primarily on the basis of
economic need and financial hardship.
To deal with the problem2 67 of expensive and scarce tax
exempt bonds, which make it difficult for public/private
partnerships, environmental bonds should be reclassified as
governmental bonds (which cost less to issue), provided that the
proceeds are used primarily to finance public purpose projects.68
Considering the pitfalls in the enforcement model, I
recommend the following: the implementation of a sound system
of checks and balances between the various arms of government
involved in enforcement; enactment of a statute providing an
economic incentive for owners of treatment plants and for violators
to comply with the discharge monitoring reports system; and the
passage of legislation requiring owners of treatment plants to pay
for inspection costs.
The legislature should enact a statute requiring private
enforcers to pay the fines procured from suits into environmental
project funds, to set up non-tax deductible credit projects and to
use the monies solely for remediation of environmental harms.
Such a statute would deal with the potential for abuse of the right
to implement credit programs.269
Further, economic experts in environmental enforcement
agencies should conduct intensive research to evaluate a number of
municipal related matters including: the level of priority accorded
waste water treatment projects by non-complying districts; the
profits derived by such municipalities from non-compliance and the
financial gains incurred from the diversion of funds to other more
lucrative sectors of the economy.
To deal with the inaccuracy of the discharge monitoring
report system, the legislature should enact a statute requiring the
reduction of penalties of violators that religiously and voluntarily
267. State restriction on the amount of private activity bonds that can be issued.
268. See section two.
269. Supra note 219.
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submit reports to environmental enforcement agencies. The
legislation should require the imposition of a more stringent penalty
on violators that are found guilty of trying to avoid submitting
reports to the enforcement agencies. This statute would provide an
economic incentive for violators to submit reports. To deal with
the financial and technical constraints2 0 in conducting regular on-
site inspection of treatment works, the newly established legislation
should require all owners of the treatment works to pay the
relevant agency for the cost of inspection. Regular on-site
inspection of such plants will enhance the detection of violators
who try to avoid submitting reports to the agency.
The implementation of a sound system of checks and
balances between the various branches of government is a crucial
prerequisite to effective enforcement under the CWA. Given the
aforementioned reality27' that the executive is likely to be
politically, economically and bureaucratically hampered from
instituting tougher and more aggressive enforcement measures on
POTWs, private citizen plaintiffs should continue to goad the
executive into taking such enforcement measures. However, the
executive should retain some discretionary control over the scope
and direction of the enforcement process. Citizen plaintiffs should
continue playing a supplemental role in accordance with and
subject to legislative enactments and to independent and impartial
judicial review.2 Effective environmental law cannot function
270. The relevant government agencies face financial and technical constraints
to carrying out on-site visits to confirm the accuracy of the reports and to detect
violators.
271. See section three. The requirement that citizen plaintiffs should continue
prodding the government does not stem from a complete distrust of the ability
of the latter to enforce the harsh requirements of the CWA but from the reality
that such public agencies are likely to be politically, economically and
bureaucratically constrained from instituting enforcement actions against
noncomplying districts.
272. To safeguard against abuse, the judiciary should review such executive
acts. For instance, if the executive was granted full discretionary powers to
control private enforcers, there is the danger that the nongovernmental enforcers
19941 285
286 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 2
without the judicary's creative involvement in the enforcement and
oversight of the implementation of the CWA. The courts have a
significant role to play in ensuring the power of the public to
participate effectively in a democracy governed by complex and
complicated bureaucracies. To encourage extensive enforcement
by public agencies, Congress could reduce penalties and increase
EPA's enforcement budget.
2 73
would be hindered from goading the government enforcement agencies.
Conversely, if the private enforcement process is not monitored by the executive
and the judiciary, there will be the risk of over enforcement (by private
enforcers) resulting partly from the filing of frivolous suits.
273. See section three.
